Sara Mills, *Discourse* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1-22, 48-76, 160-73.

1

INTRODUCTION

The term 'discourse' has become common currency in a variety of disciplines: critical theory, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, social psychology and many other fields, so much so that it is frequently left undefined, as if its usage were simply common knowledge. It is used widely in analysing literary and non-literary texts and it is often employed to signal a certain theoretical sophistication in ways which are vague and sometimes obfuscatory. It has perhaps the widest range of possible significations of any term in literary and cultural theory, and yet it is often the term within theoretical texts which is least defined. It is interesting therefore to trace the ways in which we try to make sense of the term. The most obvious way to track down its range of meanings is through consulting a dictionary, but here the more general meanings of the term and its more theoretical usages seem to have become enmeshed, since the theoretical meanings always have an overlaying of the more general meanings. The history of the development of the general use of the term has been chequered; if we take even the simplest route through its history we can see a shifting from the highlighting of one aspect of usage to another:

> **discourse** 1. verbal communication; talk, conversation; 2. a formal treatment of a subject in speech or writing; 3. a unit of text used by linguists for the analysis of linguistic phenomena that range over more than one sentence; 4. **to discourse**: the ability to reason (*archaic*); 5. **to discourse on/upon**: to speak or write about formally; 6. to hold a discussion; 7. to give forth (music) (*archaic*)
> (14th century, from Medieval Latin. *discursus*: argument, from Latin, a running to and fro *discurrere*)
>
> (*Collins Concise English Dictionary*, 1988)

> **discourse**: 1. a conversation, especially of a formal nature; formal and orderly expression of ideas in speech or writing; also such expression in the form of a sermon, treatise, etc.; a piece or unit of connected speech or writing (*Middle English: discours*, from Latin: act of running about)
>
> (*Longman Dictionary of the English Language*, 1984)

This sense of the general usage of discourse as having to do with conversation and 'holding forth' on a subject, or giving a speech, has been partly due to the etymology of the word. However, it has also been due to the fact that this is the core meaning of the term *discours* in French, and since the 1960s it is a word which has been associated with French philosophical thought, even though the terms *discours* and discourse do not correspond to one another exactly. Thus a French/English dictionary gives us:

> **discours**: a) speech; **tous ces beaux discours**: all this fine talk (*pejorative*); **suis moi sans faire de discours**: follow me and no arguing! **perdre son temps en discours**: to waste one's time talking; b) **discours direct/indirect**: direct/indirect speech (*linguistics*); c) discourse: (*philosophical treatise*); **discourir**: faire un discours: to discourse; to hold forth upon; to chat (*pejorative*)
>
> (*Collins Robert Concise French Dictionary*, 1990)

During the 1960s the general meaning of the term, its philosophical meaning and a new set of more theoretical meanings began to diverge slightly, but these more general meanings have always been kept in play, inflecting the theoretical meanings in particular ways.

Within the theoretical range of meanings, it is difficult to know where or how to track down the meaning of discourse. Glossaries of theoretical terms are sometimes of help, but very often the disciplinary context in which the term occurs is more important in trying to determine which of these meanings is being brought into play. This book aims to try to map out the contexts within which the term discourse is used, in order to narrow down the range of possible meanings. It is largely the constraints that bound disciplinary structures which demarcate the various meanings of the term: when linguists talk of a 'discourse of advertising', they are clearly referring to something quite different to a social psychologist who talks of a 'discourse of racism'.

Yet, even within a particular discipline, there is a great deal of fluidity in the range of reference of the term discourse. Consider, for example, David Crystal's attempt to pin down the meaning of the term's use within linguistics, by contrasting it to the use of the term text:

> Discourse analysis focusses on the structure of naturally occurring spoken language, as found in such 'discourses' as conversations, interviews, commentaries, and speeches. Text analysis focusses on the structure of written language, as found in such 'texts' as essays, notices, road signs, and chapters. But this distinction is not clear-cut, and there have been many other uses of these labels. In particular, 'discourse' and 'text' can be used in a much broader sense to include *all* language units with a definable communicative function, whether spoken or written. Some scholars talk about 'spoken or written discourse'; others about 'spoken or written text'.
>
> (Crystal, 1987: 116; emphasis in original)

Discourse, like any other term, is also largely defined by what it is not, what it is set in opposition to; thus, discourse is often characterised by its difference to a series of terms: text, sentence, ideology – each of these oppositional terms marks out the meaning of discourse. For example, Geoffrey Leech and Michael Short argue that:

> Discourse is linguistic communication seen as a transaction between speaker and hearer, as an interpersonal activity whose form is determined by its social purpose. Text is linguistic communication (either spoken or written) seen simply as a message coded in its auditory or visual medium.
>
> (cited in Hawthorn, 1992: 189)

And Hawthorn himself comments on this opposition between text and discourse:

> Michael Stubbs (1983) treats text and discourse as more or less synonymous, but notes that in other usages a text may be written, while a discourse is spoken, a text may be non-interactive whereas a discourse is interactive . . . a text may be short or long whereas a discourse implies a certain length, and a text must be possessed of surface cohesion whereas a discourse must be possessed of a deeper coherence. Finally, Stubbs notes that other theorists distinguish between abstract theoretical construct and pragmatic realization, although, confusingly, such theorists are not agreed upon which of these is represented by the term *text*.
>
> (Hawthorn, 1992: 189; emphasis in original)

Emile Benveniste contrasts discourse with 'the language system', when he states:

> The sentence, an undefined creation of limitless variety, is the very life of human speech in action. We conclude from this that with the sentence we leave the domain of language as a system of signs and enter into another universe, that of language as an instrument of communication, whose expression is discourse.
>
> (Benveniste, 1971: 110)

He thus characterises discourse as the domain of communication, but goes on to contrast discourse with history, or story (*histoire*), which is a distinction more finely developed in French than in English because of the use of different past tenses for formally narrating events and representing events within a more oral frame of reference:

> Discourse must be understood in its widest sense: every utterance assuming a speaker and a hearer, and in the speaker, the intention of influencing the other in some way . . . It is every variety of oral discourse of every nature from trivial conversation to the most elaborate oration . . . but it is also the mass of writing that reproduces oral discourse or that borrows its manner of expression and its purposes: correspondence, memoirs, plays, didactic works, in short, all genres in which someone addresses himself [*sic*] as the speaker, and organizes what he says in the category of person. The distinction we are making between historical narration and discourse does not at all coincide with that between written language and the spoken. Historical utterance is today reserved to the written language, but discourse is written as well as spoken. In practice, one passes from one to the other instantaneously. Each time that discourse appears in the midst of historical narration, for example, when the historian reproduces someone's words or when he himself intervenes in order to comment upon the events reported, we pass to another tense system, that of discourse.
>
> (ibid.: 208–9)

Because this seems to be such a specific use of the term, many theorists sometimes prefer to retain the French usage, *histoire/discours*, rather than using the English words.

Some theorists contrast discourse with ideology, for example, Roger Fowler states:

> 'Discourse' is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs etc. constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience – 'ideology' in the neutral non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which the discourse is embedded.
>
> (cited in Hawthorn, 1992: 48)

Thus, when we try to define discourse, we may resort to reference to dictionaries, to the disciplinary context of utterance or to terms which are used in contrast to discourse, even though none of these strategies produces a simple, clear meaning of the term, but rather only serves to show us the fluidity of its meaning.

In order to try to introduce some clarity into the definition of the term, this introduction aims to provide some fairly straightforward working definitions, as they are currently used within different disciplines. However, discourse, as will be readily observed, cannot be pinned down to one meaning, since it has had a complex history and it is used in a range of different ways by different theorists. As Michel Foucault comments:

> Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 'discourse', I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.
>
> (Foucault, 1972: 80)

If we analyse this quotation a little, we will be able to isolate the range of meanings that the term discourse has accrued to itself within Foucault's work. The first definition that Foucault gives is the widest one: 'the general domain of all statements'; that is, all utterances or texts which have meaning and which have some effects in the real world count as discourse. This is a broad definition and is generally used by Foucault in this way, particularly in his earlier work, when he is discussing the concept of discourse at a theoretical level. It may be useful to consider this usage to be more about discourse than about a discourse or discourses, with which the second and third definitions are concerned. The second definition that he gives – 'an individualizable group of statements' – is one which is used more often by Foucault when he is discussing the particular structures within discourse; thus, he is concerned to be able to identify discourses, that is, groups of utterances which seem to be regulated in some way and which seem to have a coherence and a force to them in common. Within this definition, therefore, it would be possible to talk about a discourse of femininity, a discourse of imperialism, and so on. Foucault's third definition of discourse is perhaps the one which has most resonance for many theorists: 'a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements'. I take this to mean that, here, he is interested less in the actual utterances/texts that are produced than in the rules and structures which produce particular utterances and texts. It is this rule-governed nature of discourse that is of primary importance within this definition. Within most discourse theorists' work, these definitions are used almost interchangeably and one can be overlaid on the other.

To make matters even more complex, whilst Foucault's definitions of discourse have been extremely influential within cultural theory in general, he is by no means the only theorist to use the term, and other definitions of discourse often became enmeshed in the general meanings of the term. For example, Mikhail Bakhtin sometimes uses discourse to signify either a voice (as in double-voiced

discourse) or a method of using words which presumes authority (this usage is influenced by the meaning of the Russian word for discourse, *slovo*) (Hawthorn, 1992: 48). Within structuralist and post-structuralist theory, the use of the term discourse signalled a major break with previous views of language and representation. Rather than seeing language as simply expressive, as transparent, as a vehicle of communication, as a form of representation, structuralist theorists and in turn post-structuralists saw language as a system with its own rules and constraints, and with its own determining effect on the way that individuals think and express themselves. The use of the term discourse, perhaps more than any other term, signals this break with past views of language.

As I mentioned above, what makes the process of defining discourse even more complex is that most theorists when using the term do not specify which of these particular meanings they are using. Furthermore, most theorists, as I discuss in Chapters 4 and 5, modify even these basic definitions. What is necessary is to be able to decide in which context the term is being used, and hence what meanings have accrued to it. This book is concerned with demarcating the boundaries of the meanings of discourse, and in the chapters which follow I will be concerned with three contexts of usage, broadly speaking, cultural theory, linguistics and critical linguistics/social psychology. But perhaps it may be useful here to sketch out in a schematic way the range of definitions and the contexts within which they occur, before going on to analyse these in more detail.

CULTURAL THEORY/CRITICAL THEORY/ LITERARY THEORY

Influenced largely by Foucault's work, within cultural theory as a whole, discourse is often used in an amalgam of the meanings derived from the term's Latin and French origins and influences (a speech/conversation) and a more specific theoretical meaning

which sees discourse as the general domain of the production and circulation of rule-governed statements. A distinction may be usefully made between this general, abstract theoretical concern with *discourse* and the analysis of individual discourses, or groupings of statements produced within power relations. In Bakhtin's work, and also in Roland Barthes' work, however, as I noted above, a discourse can be taken to represent a voice within a text or a speech position. For theorists such as Benveniste, discourse is the representation of events in a text without particular concern to their chronology in real-time (*histoire*/story).

MAINSTREAM LINGUISTICS

For many theorists within mainstream linguistics, the term discourse signifies a turning away from sentences as exemplars of usage in the abstract, that is, examples of the way that language is structured as a system, to a concern with language in use (Brown and Yule, 1983). For others, discourse implies a concern with the length of the text or utterance; thus, discourse is an extended piece of text, which has some form of internal organisation, coherence or cohesion (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975; Carter and Simpson, 1989). For other mainstream linguists, discourse is defined by the context of occurrence of certain utterances (thus, the discourse of religion, the discourse of advertising). These contexts of production of texts will determine the internal constituents of the specific texts produced.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY/CRITICAL LINGUISTICS

For social psychologists and critical linguists, discourse is used in a variety of ways, but all of them fuse meanings derived from mainstream linguistics and cultural theory. Thus, social psychologists tend to integrate a concern with power relations and the resultant structures of authorised utterances, such as racism or sexism, with a methodology derived from early discourse analysis

(Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1995). Critical linguists such as Norman Fairclough have tended to be similarly concerned with power relations and the way these shape the production of utterances and texts, but his methodology has been influenced by more recent discourse analysis, and he is thus able to provide a more complex model of the way that discourse functions, and the effects that it has on participants (Fairclough, 1992b). This fusion of linguistics and cultural theory has inevitably resulted in an overlaying of the meanings of discourse from both fields.

This book is mainly focused on how Michel Foucault's ideas on discourse have been integrated into various disciplines in different ways. I will now turn, therefore, to a brief discussion of his work, together with a discussion of Michel Pecheux's theorisation of discourse. I then consider the way that literature might be usefully seen as a discourse, drawing on Foucault's work. This will be followed in Chapters 2 and 3 by more detailed examinations of the uses to which Foucault put the term. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will examine the modifications which cultural theorists, particularly those working within feminist theory, colonial and post-colonial discourse theory, have made to his work and the way that they put the term discourse to work in analysis. Chapter 6 then analyses the way that discourse has at the same time had different trajectories in terms of the way that it has worked out its meanings within discourse analysis, critical linguistics and social psychology.

CULTURAL THEORY AND MODELS OF DISCOURSE

Whilst Michel Foucault is one of the theorists most often referred to when discussing the term discourse, as Diane Macdonnell has clearly shown, there are a large number of theorists whose work on the theorising of discourse is important (Macdonnell, 1986). Macdonnell discusses in detail the differences between the definitions developed by Michel Foucault, Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst,

and Louis Althusser and Valentin Voloshinov/Mikhail Bakhtin. She concludes that it is the institutional nature of discourse and its situatedness in the social which is central to all these different perspectives. She states: 'dialogue is the primary condition of discourse: all speech and writing is social' (ibid.: 1), and goes on to say: 'discourses differ with the kinds of institutions and social practices in which they take shape and with the positions of those who speak and those whom they address' (ibid.). Thus, a discourse is not a disembodied collection of statements, but groupings of utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted within a social context, which are determined by that social context and which contribute to the way that social context continues its existence. Institutions and social context therefore play an important determining role in the development, maintenance and circulation of discourses. This institutional nature of discourse is particularly notable in the work of Michel Pecheux, and in discussing his theorising of discourse, Macdonnell comments:

> A 'discourse' as a particular area of language use may be identified by the institutions to which it relates and by the positions from which it comes and which it marks out for the speaker. The position does not exist by itself, however. Indeed, it may be understood as a standpoint taken up by the discourse through its relation to another, ultimately an opposing discourse.
>
> (ibid.: 3)

Thus, particularly in Pecheux's work, discourses (here, groups of utterances/texts which have similar force or effect) do not occur in isolation but in dialogue, in relation to or, more often, in contrast and opposition to other groups of utterances. A simple example of this is the way that the discourse of environmentalism has been structured in reaction to government economic and strategic development policies, and also in reaction to ecological disasters. In this sense, the form that environmental philosophies

have developed has depended in a large measure on events and discursive frameworks external to it. However, it could equally be argued that government policy is framed precisely in reaction to pressure groups such as environmental groups; therefore, each group will have its discursive parameters defined for it by the other.

A further aspect which all these views of discourse have in common is that they consider discourses to be principally organised around practices of exclusion. Whilst what it is possible to say seems self-evident and natural, this naturalness is a result of what has been excluded, that which is almost unsayable. Thus, for example, it seems self-evident that we should talk about menstruation in negative terms, describing it in terms analogous to imprisonment and cloaking it in secrecy. One has only to look at advertisements for tampons and sanitary towels to feel this discursive pressure. This feels fairly uncontroversial, since many Western women experience menstruation as a burden, as painful and as limiting their normal lives; but the fact that some women's experience ties in with or is conditioned by discursive pressure does not mean that it has some authentic or real existence. This particular view of menstruation and the experience of menstruation is made possible by the fact that other ways of knowing about menstruation have been excluded. This way of looking at the way women's bodies function can be seen to be part of a medicalised discourse of women's health, which categorises such events as childbirth and menstruation as pathological in relation to a perceived male norm (Shuttle and Redgrove, 1978; Laws, 1990). This is not to suggest, as Shuttle and Redgrove have, that women should therefore celebrate menstruation, but rather to call for a recognition of the excluding of any positive appraisal of the way women's bodies function. What feminist theorists have attempted to do in the last twenty years is to question the naturalisation of these dominant discursive structures within which women's health is discussed in order to make those excluded discursive positions available and to gain credence for them.

A further factor which Macdonnell isolates as pertaining to all definitions of discourse is that 'whatever signifies or has meaning can be considered part of discourse' (Macdonnell, 1986: 4). Whilst this may be seen by some as being too wide a definition of discourse, it does emphasise the fact that discourses are not simple groupings of utterances or statements, but consist of utterances which have meaning, force and effect within a social context. As I will show in Chapter 3, statements – the most fundamental building blocks of discourse – are those utterances or parts of text which have an effect. Statements are not the same as sentences, but are those utterances which can be seen to be grouped around one particular effect.[1] Thus, when a judge says 'I sentence you to three years imprisonment', there are a number of these effects. The judge is institutionally sanctioned, and therefore the force of her/his pronouncement is to transform the accused into a criminal and to enforce a particular sentence on that person. Thus, 'I sentence you . . . ' can be regarded both as a statement and as part of a discourse, since such a statement can only have effect if it is uttered within the context of other utterances (i.e., if certain procedures have been adhered to) and if it takes place within an institutional setting (i.e., within a court room, by an appointed judge).

One theorist whose work can usefully be read in conjunction with Michel Foucault's is the Marxist linguist, Michel Pecheux. His work on discourse (Pecheux, 1982) is important in that he tried to analyse the meanings of words and their relations to larger structures without assuming that words and sentences had a meaning in themselves. He conducted an experiment, later termed the 'Mansholt report', whereby he gave students an economics text to read; he told one group of students that it was a left-wing text and the other group that it was a right-wing text. The text itself could be broadly categorised as a middle-of-the-road economics text, but he showed that each group read the text selectively to fit in with the political framing that he had given it.

In this sense, he gives shape to Foucault's work on discourse by giving a concrete example of the way in which discourses shape our interpretation of texts. If we employ a discourse of 'left-wing economics texts' to interpret a text, we will imbue that text with the meanings of the larger framing discourse.

Pecheux's work is important in that he stresses more than Foucault the conflictual nature of discourse, that it is always in dialogue and in conflict with other positions. He stresses the fact that ideological struggle is the essence of discourse structure. Pecheux also makes a useful addition to thinking on discourses, since he is concerned, as are such theorists as Renée Balibar, with questions of access; whilst Foucault tends to deal with a fairly stable notion of access to discourses, Pecheux is concerned that, for example, people who are not privileged within the class system, through lack of access to education, knowledge and familiarity with information networks and capital, are similarly prevented from having easy access to discourses. Thus, although the same language may be spoken throughout a country (this itself is debatable given, for example, the multicultural environment of Britain in the 1990s), there is a sense in which access to those discursive frameworks which circulate in society is not equally available to all. An example of this is the exclusions in operation with regard to who can publish in an academic journal; in theory, anyone can submit an article for an academic journal, but in practice the article will only be published if it submits to the formal rules of the discourse governing the structures contained within academic papers (i.e., it uses the vocabulary and formal language recognised as appropriate for such writing; it draws critically on other academic articles and cites recent publications by other academics; it conforms to the concerns of articles within that particular journal and uses the vocabulary associated with those concerns). However, generally there are other unspoken rules which govern whether an article is published or not, and these are related to whether the writer is employed by

an educational institution, whether the writer is known to the editors or referees of the article, and so on. Thus, whilst access to publishing is, apparently, open to all, in fact there are a number of discursive and institutional barriers which limit academic publishing to those people who are employed in academic posts, who know the discursive rules for writing academic articles and who are able to manipulate their own concerns in line with those discursive structures.

Discourses structure both our sense of reality and our notion of our own identity. Pecheux's work is also very useful in that it enables us to consider ways in which subjects can come to a position of disidentification, whereby we not only locate and isolate the ways in which we as subjects have been constructed and subjected, but we also map out for ourselves new terrains in which we can construct different and potentially more liberating ways in which we can exist. The Women's Movement has been important for many women in mapping out new discursive roles both for men and women. These roles are strongly contested by media representations and by the representations which are constructed through people's interactions with stereotypes of all kinds. But this type of critical knowledge has fundamentally changed and re-presented what it means to exist as a gendered subject. Thus, to go back to the earlier example of menstruation, it is clear that feminist writing and action on women's health has enabled menstruation to be talked about within the public domain, and even for women's sanitary products to be advertised on television. Feminist reappraisals of menstruation have meant that advertising no longer stresses imprisonment; in fact, it could be said that the pressures of feminism have resulted in the altogether surreal advertisements for such products as Bodyform and Tampax where menstruating women perform athletic acts (skydiving, swimming, surfing, pushing broken-down cars) which perhaps are not featured in other forms of advertising for products targeted at women. Thus, feminist disidentification with the dominant discourses

concerned with menstruation has resulted in changes in the representation of menstruation within the public domain, and ultimately in alternative ways of considering women's health. However, in this instance, the surreal nature of the advertising concerning sanitary products does signal a singular inability to cope with the experience of menstruation – the advertisements are still concerned with the erasing of menstruation, rather than with dealing with more positive views of menstrual periods.

Thus, for Pecheux in particular, discourses do not exist in isolation, but are the object and site of struggle. Discourses are thus not fixed but are the site of constant contestation of meaning.

MICHEL FOUCAULT AND DISCOURSE

> What I have said is not 'what I think' but often what I wonder whether it couldn't be thought.
>
> (Foucault, 1979d: 58)

> Foucault's study begins the immense task of dismantling the theme that knowledge is an expression of men's [*sic*] ideas.
>
> (Macdonnell, 1986: 86)

Michel Foucault's work has been crucial to the development of a range of different theories which have been broadly grouped under the term 'discourse theory', and it is for this reason that this book will focus primarily on his work. Foucault's work is often difficult to understand, partly because of its sometimes convoluted style and the density of reference he uses. But perhaps, the main reason why Foucault is considered difficult is because, more than any other theorist, he challenges many of the preconceived notions that we have about a wide range of different subjects: sexuality, madness, discipline, subjectivity, language.

I endeavour in Chapters 3 and 4 of this book to draw on some of Foucault's writing which helps readers to think about the term discourse. Foucault does give some general definitions of discourse which I shall discuss in some detail, but perhaps the most useful

way to investigate the term is to see how it is used by Foucault in his discussions of power, knowledge and truth, since this configuration is essentially what constitutes discourse.

Foucault's work is not a system of ideas nor a general theory; his work ranges over an extremely wide variety of subjects and it is very difficult to pin him down as a historian, a philosopher, a psychologist or a critical theorist. As he himself says:

> All my books . . . are little tool boxes . . . if people want to open them, to use this sentence or that idea as a screwdriver or spanner to short-circuit, discredit or smash systems of power, including eventually those from which my books have emerged . . . so much the better.
>
> (cited in Patton, 1979a: 115)

Thus, the term discourse is not rooted within a larger system of fully worked-out theoretical ideas, but is one element in Foucault's work. This lack of system sometimes causes difficulty for theorists and may be one of the reasons that there are so many different definitions of the term discourse, and so many modifications of the meaning of the term. However, this lack of general system is also what makes for a certain flexibility when theorists are trying to use Foucault's work to fit changing social circumstances.

One of the most productive ways of thinking about discourse is not as a group of signs or a stretch of text, but as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1972: 49). In this sense, a discourse is something which produces something else (an utterance, a concept, an effect), rather than something which exists in and of itself and which can be analysed in isolation. A discursive structure can be detected because of the systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context, and because of the effects of those ways of thinking and behaving. Thus, we can assume that there is a set of discourses of femininity and masculinity, because women and men behave within a certain

range of parameters when defining themselves as gendered subjects. These discursive frameworks demarcate the boundaries within which we can negotiate what it means to be gendered. It is these discourses which heterosexual, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual/transvestite subjects engage with when coming to understand themselves as sexed: when a lesbian takes up a 'femme' position, it is her perception of the discourse of heterosexual femininity that she is actively modifying and reworking and ultimately destabilising (Bell, *et al.*, 1994). This discursive framework of femininity may determine the types of clothes she chooses to wear, the types of bodily stance she adopts and ways of thinking about herself and others in relation to power.

In terms of thinking about discourse as having effects, it is important to consider the factors of truth, power and knowledge, since it is because of these elements that discourse has effects. Truth, for Foucault, is not something intrinsic to an utterance, nor is it an ideal abstract quality to which humans aspire; he sees truth as being something far more worldly and more negative:

> Truth is of the world; it is produced there by virtue of multiple constraints. . . . Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is the types of discourse it harbours and causes to function as true: the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false statements, the way in which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth: the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.
>
> (Foucault, 1979e: 46)

Truth, therefore, is something which societies have to work to produce, rather than something which appears in a transcendental way. Foucault analyses the labour which people perform to exclude certain forms of knowledge from consideration as 'true'. To consider an example which Norman Fairclough discusses (Fairclough 1992b), 'alternative' knowledge about health is not given the same status as conventional medical science; a great deal of effort and discursive work is expended on ensuring that alternative medicine is considered inferior, amateurish and falling within the sphere of charlatans, thus maintaining for medical science the authority of the 'true' and the 'scientific'. Thus, discourses do not exist in a vacuum but are in constant conflict with other discourses and other social practices which inform them over questions of truth and authority. As Foucault puts it: 'I want to try to discover how this choice of truth, inside which we are caught but which we ceaselessly renew, was made – but also how it was repeated, renewed and displaced' (Foucault, 1981: 70). Thus, Foucault is not interested in which discourse is a true or accurate representation of the 'real', in this case whether alternative therapies work more effectively than conventional medicine; rather he is concerned with the mechanics whereby one becomes produced as the dominant discourse, which is supported by institutional funding, by the provision of buildings and staff by the state, and by the respect of the population as a whole, whereas the other is treated with suspicion and is housed both metaphorically and literally at the margins of society.

Power is therefore a key element in discussions of discourse. Foucault has been instrumental in the rethinking of models of power; rather than simply assuming, as many liberal humanists have, that power is a possession (so that someone takes or seizes power from someone else) or that power is a violation of someone's rights (for example, the idea that power is simply preventing someone from doing what they want to do) or, as Marxist theorists have, that power relations are determined by economic relations, Foucault has attempted to come to terms with the complexity of the range of practices which can be summed up under the term power. He is very critical of what he terms the 'repressive hypothesis' that power is simply about preventing someone from carrying out their wishes and limiting people's freedom. John Frow puts it this way:

> If power is no longer thought simply as a negative and repressive force but as the condition of production of all speech, and if power is conceived as polar rather than monolithic, as an asymmetrical dispersion, then all utterances will be potentially splintered, formally open to contradictory uses.
>
> (Frow, 1985: 206)

This sums up the sense of Foucault's analysis of power, that is, that power is dispersed throughout social relations, that it produces possible forms of behaviour as well as restricting behaviour. This productive model of power is something many theorists have found useful, particularly when looking at ways of thinking about discourse. In thinking about the sexuality of children, in *The History of Sexuality*, Volume I, Foucault gives an example of the way in which power relations produce forms of subjectivity and behaviour rather than simply repressing them. Speaking particularly about views of children's masturbation and sexuality within the Victorian period, he states:

> It would be less than exact to say that the pedagogical institution has imposed a ponderous silence on the sex of children and adolescents. On the contrary, since the eighteenth century it has multiplied the forms of discourse on the subject; it has established various points of implantation for sex; it has coded contents and qualified speakers. Speaking about children's sex, inducing educators, physicians, administrators, and parents to speak of it, or speaking to them about it, causing children themselves to talk about it, and enclosing them in a web of discourses which sometimes address them, sometimes speak about them, or impose canonical bits of knowledge on them, or use them as a basis for constructing a science that is beyond their grasp – all this together enables us to link an intensification of the interventions of power to a multiplication of discourse.
>
> (Foucault, 1978: 32)

Thus, far from institutional pressures repressing children's sexuality, in fact, as Foucault goes on to discuss, this discursive work created the forms within which that sexuality could appear:

> Educators and doctors combatted children's onanism [male masturbation] like an epidemic that needed to be eradicated. What this actually entailed, throughout this whole secular campaign that mobilized the adult world around the sex of children, was using these tenuous pleasures as a prop, constituting them as secrets (that is, forcing them into hiding so as to make possible their discovery), tracing them back to their source . . . wherever there was a chance they might appear, devices of surveillance were installed; traps were laid for compelling admissions; inexhaustible and corrective discourses were imposed; parents and teachers were alerted, and left with the suspicion that all children were guilty.
>
> (ibid.: 42)

As Foucault goes on to argue, this vigilance around the question of male children's masturbation, rather than eradicating the practice, was one of the factors which led to an increasing sexualisation of childhood in the Victorian period.

Foucault argues for the imbrication of power with knowledge, so that all of the knowledge we have is the result or the effect of power struggles. To give an example, what is studied in schools and universities is the result of struggles over whose version of events is sanctioned. Knowledge is often the product of the subjugation of objects, or perhaps it can be seen as the process through which subjects are constituted as subjugated; for example, when consulting a university library catalogue, if you search under the term 'women', you will find a vast selection of books and articles discussing the oppression of women, the psychology of women, the physical ailments that women suffer from, and so on. If you search under the term 'men' you will not find the same wealth of information. (In Chapter 4 I will analyse closely the relation between

3

DISCURSIVE STRUCTURES

Structuralist thought focused largely on mapping out the rules governing the production of texts and systems of signification; theorists such as Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault were both interested not only in the structures which could be found in cultural artefacts, but also in the larger-scale structures which could be traced in discourse itself. One of the important assertions that Michel Foucault made in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) was that discourses are not simply groupings of utterances, grouped around a theme or an issue, nor are they simply sets of utterances which emanate from a particular institutional setting, but that discourses are highly regulated groupings of utterances or statements with internal rules which are specific to discourse itself. In this chapter, I discuss the constituents of discourse itself – the more abstract element within which particular discourses are produced. Discourse as a whole consists of regulated discourses. Discursive rules and structures do not originate from socio-economic or cultural factors as such, although they may be shaped to an extent by these factors; rather, they are a feature of discourse itself and are shaped by the internal mechanisms of discourse alone.

Both Barthes' and Foucault's later work moves away from this original premise, but it is still important to retain this notion of discourse being rule-governed and internally structured. Thus, the study of discourse is not simply the analysis of utterances and statements; it is also a concern with the structures and rules of discourse. These structures and rules are the focus of this chapter. Foucault termed this type of analysis of discursive structures 'archaeology'. For him archaeology:

> does not imply the search for a beginning; it does not relate to geological excavation. It designates the general theme of a description that questions the already-said at the level of its existence, of the enunciative function that operates within it, of the discursive formation, and the general archive system to which it belongs. Archaeology describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive.
>
> (Foucault, 1972: 131)

This description of archaeological analysis may seem particularly intractable at first sight; in fact, Foucault is simply trying to stress that the main reason for conducting an analysis of the structures of discourse is not to uncover the truth or the origin of a statement but rather to discover the support mechanisms which keep it in place. These support mechanisms are both intrinsic to discourse itself and also extra-discursive, in the sense that they are socio-cultural. Thus, in this quotation, Foucault is concerned to set statements in their discursive frameworks, that is, statements do not exist in isolation since there is a set of structures which makes those statements make sense and gives them their force.[1]

Before beginning a description of discursive structures, it is necessary to describe the relation between discourse and the real. The focus of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is largely on the relation of texts and discourses to the real, and the construction of the real by discursive structures. There is a strong sense in which

the real is characterised as a set of constructs formed through discourse. The real itself is never defined as such by Foucault, since for him we have access only to the discursive structures which determine our perceptions of the real. John Frow comments: 'The discursive is a socially constructed reality which constructs both the real and the symbolic and the distinction between them. It assigns structure to the real at the same time as it is a product and a moment of real structures' (Frow, 1985: 200). There has been a great deal of rather pointless debate about whether Foucault is in fact denying the existence of the real when he stresses the formative powers of discourse, and historians in particular have attacked him for denying the existence of historical events (see Taylor, 1986 for an overview). However, perhaps it is more useful to see Foucault's views on the relation between discourse and the real in the following terms, as set out by Laclau and Mouffe:

> The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence.
>
> (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108)

Thus, Foucault does not deny the existence of the real; on the contrary, he asserts that what we perceive to be significant and how we interpret objects and events and set them within systems of meaning is dependent on discursive structures. Those discursive structures are, for Foucault, what make objects and events appear

to us to be real or material. This view of the materiality of discursive structures has, however, been questioned by many theorists, most notably by Terry Lovell, when she criticises this very determinist view: 'signs cannot be permitted to swallow up their referents in a never-ending chain of signification, in which one sign always points to another, and the circle is never broken by the intrusion of that to which the sign refers' (Lovell 1980: 16). However, whilst Foucault suggests that discourses structure our sense of reality, he does not see these systems as being abstract or enclosed. He is concerned with the way that discourses inform the extent to which we can think and act only within certain parameters at each historical conjuncture. Thus, although he sees the real as constructed through discursive pressures, he is also well aware of the effect of this 'reality' on thought and behaviour.

For Foucault, our perception of objects is formed within the limits of discursive constraints: discourse is characterised by a 'delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts or theories' (Foucault, 1977a: 199). Let us analyse the three assertions in this quotation in some detail. The first thing to notice is that, for Foucault, discourse causes a narrowing of one's field of vision, to exclude a wide range of phenomena from being considered as real or as worthy of attention, or as even existing; thus, delimiting a field is the first stage in establishing a set of discursive practices. Then, in order for a discourse or an object to be activated, to be called into existence, the knower has to establish a right for him/herself to speak. Thus, entry into discourse is seen to be inextricably linked to questions of authority and legitimacy. Finally, each act somehow maps out the possible uses which can be made of that statement, or future rules for its use (although of course that is not necessarily what happens to it). Each statement leads to others and, in a sense, it has to have embedded within it the parameters of the possible ways in which future statements can be made.

Discourse, for Foucault, constitutes objects for us. One of Foucault's most famous quotations about the constitution of objects is the following: 'We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher. The world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour' (Foucault, 1981: 67). That is, there is no intrinsic order to the world itself other than the ordering which we impose on it through our linguistic description of it. An example of this constitution of objects through discourse is the changes in the way the borderline between animals and plants has been drawn differently at different historical periods. In the nineteenth century, bacteria were placed within the category 'animal', whereas now they are located in a separate categorisation of their own. Several organisms have been switched from one category to another, for example, algae, diatoms and other micro-organisms. In fact, the categories 'plant' and 'animal' are constantly being redefined by which living things are placed within each categorisation – a *post-hoc* categorisation system which is discursive rather than one which is determined by the 'real' nature of plants and animals. Plants and animals, in fact, share many elements, but the fact that we separate them into two groupings means that we concentrate on the differences we perceive between these two categories rather than on their shared features. The fact that the boundary has shifted shows clearly that there is no natural ready-made boundary between animal and plant life, but that humans have thought it necessary to draw this boundary. It might be more useful for the difference between animals and plant to be thought of on a cline or continuum, but within current systems of thinking about this subject it is considered necessary to classify plant and animal life as separate. This could be related to the fact that we have moved away from the nineteenth-century polymath ability to undertake multi-disciplinary work; instead, at present, botany and zoology are seen as two separate sciences with separate departments in universities,

and as separate disciplines with different methodologies and spheres of interest.

A further example of the way that discursive boundaries structure what we consider to be real categories might be Linnean typologies of plant categorisation. When nineteenth-century botanists travelled to foreign countries to investigate non-European plant species, they carried with them a categorisation system originally developed by Linneaus to categorise European plants. As Mary Louise Pratt has shown, this meant that the plants which were 'discovered' by Europeans within India and Africa were categorised within a European system of classification which aimed to be a global system (Pratt, 1992). The plants were extracted from the systems of classification which indigenous subjects had developed to describe their properties, uses and habitats, and they became part of a wider colonial project which aimed to demonstrate the 'civilising' force of colonialism. The plants were thus no longer seen in terms of their original classification system, which often related to their use in medicine, their food-value, their relation to other elements within an eco-system and their position within a cosmological and symbolic system, but rather they were seen out of context in terms of the similarity or dissimilarity of their morphology (plant structure) to European plant species. When the plant species were 'discovered' by Europeans, their names were changed from their indigenous names to classifications generated from the Linnean system (i.e., by analogy with previous Latin names) and often they were named after the European who had 'discovered' them. Thus, this global Eurocentric knowledge did not simply rename a few plant species, but annihilated indigenous knowledge and transformed the knowledge about plants in non-European countries into colonial knowledge (Mills, 1994b).

Discourse does not simply construct material objects, such as particular groups of plants; discourse also constructs certain events and sequences of events into narratives which are recognised by a particular culture as real or serious events. For example, within

Western cultures, miscarriage is considered to be simply a failed pregnancy, rather than the death of a baby. Therefore, there are no ritualised structures within which those who suffer miscarriages can deal with their loss. Through discourse, miscarriage is constructed as a failed event and not a real event in its own right. In a similar way, relationships which do not result in the couple living together or getting married are viewed by many people as not 'serious'. Thus, there is only one sanctioned narrative within the discourse of romantic love: there are many other pathways within which individuals work out their relations with other people, but this particular narrative sequence, which has as its end a formalised union of some sort, excludes certain types of relationships from being counted as real (Mills and White, forthcoming).

Foucault's position, which suggests that objects and ideas are created by humans and institutions and that it is this which constitutes reality for us, has been criticised because it seems to suggest that there is nothing which is non-discursive and outside discourse. But Foucault is not denying that there is a reality which pre-exists humans, nor is he denying the materiality of events and experience, as some of his critics have alleged; it is simply that the only way we have to apprehend reality is through discourse and discursive structures. In the process of apprehending, we categorise and interpret experience and events according to the structures available to us and, in the process of interpretation, we lend these structures a solidity and a normality which it is often difficult to think outside of. Foucault does not consider these structures to be simply the invention of institutions or powerful groups of people, as some Marxist thinkers have suggested in their formulating of the notion of ideology, nor does he propose that they are simply abstract and arbitrary. Rather, he considers that there is a combined force of institutional and cultural pressure, together with the intrinsic structure of discourse, which always exceeds the plans and desires of the institution or of those in power.

Roland Barthes' analysis of discursive structures, in *Fragments: A Lover's Discourse* (1990), is complementary to Foucault's work, in that he too is concerned to describe the structures within which individuals in love are at the mercy of the tropes, moods, emotions, gestures, tones of voice which the discourse of the lover lays out for them. Barthes considers all of these structured elements to constitute what he calls 'fragments', which make up the discourse as a whole. As he puts it:

> throughout any love life, figures occur to the lover without any order, for on each occasion they depend on an (internal or external?) accident . . . the amorous subject draws on a reservoir (the thesaurus?) of figures . . . the figures are non-syntagmatic, non-narrative.
>
> (Barthes, 1990: 6–7)

The questioning tone that Barthes adopts in this quotation is emblematic of his analysis of discursive structures as a whole – he wants to be able to describe the way that these figures determine the feelings and states which the lover experiences without concerning himself with explaining or discovering a source for these figures. Thus, he offers to the reader a list of alphabetically organised fragments which for him constitute the discourse of the lover; these figures are wide-ranging, from descriptions of states such as waiting, deception and absence, to analyses of the quality of language used by the lover. It is less an attempt to chart the 'grammar' of the lover's discourse than it is a testing of the limits of the personal within discourse. It is clear that he chose to analyse the lover's discourse since it is at one and the same time the experience which seems to most people to be the most deeply personal, and yet it is also that which is the most intensively discursively structured. Perhaps connected with this ambivalence is the fact that it is the experience which most tests one's powers of expression: Barthes suggests that it seems like 'the end of language' where in effect one repeats endlessly 'I love you because I love you' (ibid.:

21). Barthes' experiment with describing the discursive structures of love has wider implications for the analysis of discourse as a whole. The fragment as a constituent part of discourse is certainly a suggestive way of mapping out these structures.

However, in order to try to examine in more detail some of the constituents of discourse, I now turn to Foucault again, since his work is perhaps more 'grammatical' and in a sense more easily applicable to other contexts. I examine the structures which Foucault suggests are intrinsic to discourse, most notably the episteme, the statement, the discourse and the archive. Boundaries and limits are very important, in the sense of the function of these categories and structures, and I therefore go on to consider the ways in which perhaps the most important structure of discourse is less its constituent parts but rather the function of exclusion. Following on from this, I then consider the way that certain discourses are circulated and in effect kept in existence.

THE EPISTEME

The sense of the world of objects being constructed by institutions within social groups, particularly through language, has been a concern of a great many post-structuralist theorists and linguists. But perhaps Foucault is the only theorist who has seriously attempted to examine the change in these discursive systems over time and the changes that this subsequently causes to those cultures' views of reality. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), Foucault attempts to chart these changes systematically so that he can map the discursive limits of an episteme, that is, the sets of discursive structures as a whole within which a culture thinks. Groups of discourses make up the structures of an episteme and, as Macdonnell states, an episteme 'may be understood as the ground of thought on which at a particular time some statements – and not others – will count as knowledge' (Macdonnell, 1986: 87). These groups of discursive units do not constitute a *Weltanschauung*

or world-view, since this assumes a coherence and cohesiveness to a set of ideas. Thus, we might discuss the 'Romantic world-view' or the 'Elizabethan world-view', which is the philosophical and cultural underpinning of a particular group of people. Instead, an episteme consists of the sum total of the discursive structures which come about as a result of the interaction of the range of discourses circulating and authorised at that particular time. Thus, an episteme includes the range of methodologies which a culture draws on as self-evident in order to be able to think about certain subjects. Foucault shows that within certain periods there is a tendency to structure thinking about a subject in a particular way and to map out certain procedures and supports for thinking. So, for example, within the set of epistemes available within the Victorian era, scientific thought was characterised by a tendency to produce detailed tables, to label and systematise seemingly heterogeneous materials into very rigidly defined systems of classification. Consider this table from Brown's *The Races of Mankind* (1873–9).

Tschudi table of Peruvian Mongrelity illustrating the mongrel character of the Spanish American population of Peru:

Parents	**Children**
White father and negro mother	mulatto
White father and Indian mother	mestiza
Indian father and negro mother	chino
White father and mulatto mother	cuarteron
White father and mestiza mother	creole (pale brownish complexion)
White father and chino mother	chino–blanco
White father and cuarterona mother	quintero
White father and quintera mother	white
Negro father and Indian mother	zambo
Negro father and mulatto mother	zambo–negro
Negro father and mestiza mother	mulatto–oscura
Negro father and chino mother	zambo–chino

Negro father and zamba mother	zambo–negro (perfectly black)

. . .

and so on for thirty-two different 'crosses' of white, Indian and 'Negro'.

(cited in Young, 1995: 176)

For Victorians, this way of thinking about the world appeared the 'natural' way to describe racial difference, whereas when we look at these nineteenth-century classifications of racial distinctions they seem pathological in their excessive detail and scrupulous systematicity. We are alienated because here people are classified in the same way as dogs or horses might be classified, in terms of their breeding stock and the 'purity' of their lineage. As Young has shown, the same system of classification for hybridity in plants and cross-breeding in animals was transferred to the description of indigenous people (Young, 1995). But we are also distanced from this concern with charting in such meticulous detail the constituents of a field of knowledge, since this form of thinking has now been superseded by other ways of organising knowledge and information.[2] Within late twentieth-century Western thought, it is not assumed that you will grasp the essence of a subject, in this case, racial difference, merely by accumulating large amounts of data relating to the subject and organising this material into tabular form.

Foucault suggests that there are epistemic breaks, that is, at certain moments in a culture, there are discontinuous developments in discursive structures, so that for the Victorians the tabular representation of reality seemed entirely natural, whereas in the twentieth century this method of representation has begun to seem unusual. A further example that Foucault offers is of the significance given to events in relation to a divine order. Within Early Modern Europe, every event was interpreted according to a system of thought which linked the mundane world with the

supernatural or religious order. Thus, what would now be classified as a natural phenomenon, such as a severe storm, would then be classified in terms of its significance in this wider symbolic system, perhaps as a portent or as a sign of divine displeasure. Events took their meaning from their place within this cosmological system, whereas in late twentieth-century Europe, no wider supernatural significance is attributed to storms. The constituents of this particular form of knowledge have changed; and whereas we would normally see this as due to the advance of scientific and secular thinking, Foucault proposes that our own systems of knowledge constituting current epistemes will appear equally as contrived and alien to future generations. It is easier to examine the epistemes that were current in past periods and past cultures precisely because the machinery of thinking within the contemporary culture is so naturalised.

This notion of the discontinuity of discourse enabled Foucault to counter the idea of the progress of cultures; rather than European history being seen as a progression from ignorance to greater truth, where previous stages along the road to the present could be viewed only in relation to the improved present, he suggested that in fact intellectual history should be seen as simply a series of lurches from one system of classification and representation to another. In this sense, Foucault differs in his thinking from both conservative and Marxist accounts of history; for central to both of these is the notion of improvement and progress: for conservatives greater scientific knowledge brings inevitable improvement to humankind; for Marxists, revolutionary change can only bring about improvement to the conditions of the working classes. This is perhaps where Foucault has most influenced postmodern thinking, for this Utopian notion of history is very much embedded in forms of thought. Indeed, when Catherine Belsey tried to explain her move away from a Marxist feminist position to what she called a materialist feminist position, she did so in Foucauldian terms: because of problems in mapping out the possible Utopias

and clear goals which could be achieved by feminism, because of lack of consensus on what those might be, Belsey decided that the model of history – the grand narrative – which is an essential part of Marxist thought, would have to be discarded (Belsey, 1992). When she considered the advances which had been made within the past twenty years in relation to women's rights, she felt that it was necessary also to give some consideration to the areas in which women's rights had deteriorated. The model of a seamless progression of events towards an improved future disallows the consideration of such deterioration. A Foucauldian discontinuous model of history simply charts the shifts which take place within the machinery of thinking.

THE STATEMENT

Epistemes are constructed from sets of statements (énoncé) grouped into different discourses or discursive frameworks. Let us now consider what a statement is, as the primary building block of a discourse. Dreyfus and Rabinow state: 'The statement is neither an utterance nor a proposition, neither a psychological nor a logical entity, neither an event nor an ideal form' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 45). A statement is not an utterance, in the sense that one sentence can actually function as several different statements, depending upon which discursive context it appears in. As Foucault puts it:

> At a certain scale of micro-history, one may consider that an affirmation like 'species evolve' forms the same statement in Darwin and in Simpson; at a finer level, and considering more limited fields of use ('neo-Darwinism' as opposed to the Darwinian system itself) we are presented with different statements. The constancy of the statement, the preservation of its identity through the unique events of the enunciations, its duplication through the identity of the forms is constituted by the functioning of the field of use in which it is placed.
>
> (Foucault, 1972: 104)

Dreyfus and Rabinow explain that several different utterances can, in fact, constitute one single statement, as when an airline steward makes the same announcement in several different languages. They go on to say: 'Maps can be statements, if they are representations of a geographical area, and even a picture of the layout of a typewriter keyboard can be a statement if it appears in a manual as a representation of the way the letters of a keyboard are standardly arranged' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 45). Statements do seem to bear a striking similarity to the speech acts described by John Searle (1979) and John Austin (1962), although perhaps speech act theorists are more concerned with the force of an utterance, the way that an utterance is understood and acted on, than is Foucault.[3] Statements are for him those utterances which have some institutional force and which are thus validated by some form of authority – those utterances which for him would be classified as 'in the true': 'It is always possible one could speak the truth in a void; one would only be in the true, however, if one obeyed the rules of some discursive "police" which would have to be reactivated every time one spoke' (Foucault, 1972: 224). Those utterances and texts which make some form of truth-claim (and how many do not?) and which are ratified as knowledge can be classified as statements. In a sense, statements could be considered 'serious' speech acts (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 48). Foucault's archaeological analysis is concerned with the systems of support which govern the production and the ordering of these statements and, more importantly perhaps, the systems whereby other utterances are excluded from the position of being 'in the true' and therefore being classified as statements.

THE DISCOURSE/DISCOURSES

As I have tried to make clear in this chapter, there is an important distinction in Foucault's work to be made between discourse as a

whole, which is the set of rules and procedures for the production of particular discourses, and those discourses or groups of statements themselves. A discourse is a set of sanctioned statements which have some institutionalised force, which means that they have a profound influence on the way that individuals act and think. What constitutes the boundaries of a discourse is very unclear. However, we can say that discourses are those groupings of statements which have similar force – that is, they are grouped together because of some institutional pressure, because of a similarity of provenance or context, or because they act in a similar way. Thus, for example, the discourse of middle-class femininity in the nineteenth century consisted of the set of heterogeneous statements (i.e., those utterances, texts, gestures, behaviour which were accepted as describing the essence of Victorian womanhood: humility, sympathy, selflessness) and which in fact constituted the parameters within which middle-class women could work out their own sense of identity. There were other discourses which challenged this knowledge (for example, the discourses of feminism), but this discourse of femininity was the type of knowledge that was sanctioned by many of the institutions within the Victorian era – the Church, the education system and so on – and which acted together to produce the boundaries of the possible forms of middle-class womanhood. It is this concern with the constituents of discourses which has received most critical attention and which perhaps has proved most useful to cultural and critical theorists, as I show in Chapters 4 and 5 on feminist theory and post-colonial theory. Foucault himself is less interested in statements in and of themselves than in the way they coalesce into discourses or discursive formations and take some of their force from such groupings.

THE ARCHIVE

Another discursive structure which Foucault isolated is the archive: Foucault describes the archive in the following terms: 'I mean the set of rules which at a given period and for a definite society defined: 1) the limits and forms of expressibility; 2) the limits of forms of conservation; 3) the limits and forms of memory; and 4) the limits and forms of reactivation' (Foucault, 1978: 14–15). In this sense, the notion of the archive can be seen to be working alongside the notion of the episteme, and can perhaps can be best apprehended through an analysis of Foucault's later work in his essay 'The order of discourse', which I discuss below. For the moment, an archive should be seen as the set of discursive mechanisms which limit what can be said, in what form and what is counted as worth knowing and remembering. It is this sense of limitation or exclusion which I would like to consider now in more detail, since it is crucial to the understanding of the constitution of discursive structures.

EXCLUSIONS WITHIN DISCOURSE

As well as attempting to define the way that discursive structures map out what we can say and what we can consider as legitimate knowledge, Foucault's article entitled 'The order of discourse' (1981) also discusses the difficulties of inserting oneself within a discourse, of starting to speak. 'The order of discourse' was originally given as an open lecture at the prestigious College de France where Foucault was obliged to give a once-yearly public lecture. Here Foucault was having to present an academic lecture which was also accessible to an audience containing a wide variety of people. He comments:

> I think a good many people have a similar desire to be freed from the obligation to begin, a similar desire to be on the other side of discourse from the outset, without having to consider

> from the outside what might be strange, frightening, and perhaps maleficent about it. To this very common wish, the institution's reply is ironic, since it solemnises beginnings, surrounds them with a circle of attention and silence, and imposes ritualised forms on them, as if to make them more easily recognisable from a distance.
>
> (Foucault, 1981: 51)

The beginning of a lecture in such a prestigious setting would generally be marked by introductions and by the recitation of the credentials of the speaker, giving that speaker credibility and the right to speak, the right to be considered worth listening to, the right to have all other voices silenced. But what Foucault is isolating here is that, even when the entry into discourse is ritualised in this way, it cannot quite overcome the way in which discourse evades these attempts to regulate it.

In 'The order of discourse' Foucault discusses the way that discourse is regulated by institutions in order to ward off some of its dangers. He describes the processes of exclusion which operate on discourse to limit what can be said and what can be counted as knowledge. The first of the procedures of exclusion he calls 'prohibition' or taboo: there are certain subjects which it is difficult to discuss within Western societies, such as death and sex. Within British culture many people have remarked that they have felt shunned and avoided by even their closest friends if their partner has died, because of the perceived difficulty of talking about death, and the lack of vocabulary in English to express one's feelings without sounding either hackneyed, insincere or overly formal. Within other cultures, and in the past in Britain, death was a subject which was discussed openly and which had a wide range of supports, i.e., material practices, rituals and artefacts which made it possible to talk about. In some cultures, such as Mexico, there is a proliferation of discourses around death. And indeed, within Victorian Britain there was an array of statements, artefacts and practices

which would now be considered morbid or sentimental, but which allowed discussion of death and mourning.

Within Victorian Britain, it was very difficult to discuss sex openly and remain respectable, and sexual subjects were avoided at all costs within 'polite' society and mixed groups. Some of the societies which British subjects encountered within the colonial relationship had very different views on sexuality; for example, in India, as Macmillan notes:

> some temples had carvings which were obscene (or erotic, depending on your point of view). Memsahibs who went sightseeing were carefully steered away from them by their escorts; indeed a popular nineteenth century guidebook advised tipping local guides at a particularly notorious temple so that they would not call attention to shocking scenes.
>
> (Macmillan, 1988: 105)

There is nothing intrinsic to these subjects which makes them difficult to talk about, but for British culture, particularly within the Victorian period, it seemed self-evident that these were difficult topics. It is simply a discursive and institutional limitation which becomes habitual within particular cultures at certain periods. Once a subject is tabooed, that status begins to feel self-evident.

A second exclusion on what can be said centres around the discourse of those who are considered insane and therefore not rational. Foucault argues that in different historical periods, the speech of the mad person was considered either to be on the level of divine insight, or totally meaningless. In twentieth-century Britain the language of schizophrenics, for example, is not given credence, so that when seemingly 'mad' people speak, they are not heeded; if they make requests for particular types of treatment which are not sanctioned by those in authority they are generally ignored. It is assumed that the wishes and views of 'rational' people, such as doctors and social workers, carry more weight.

The third exclusion which maps out what can count as a statement and therefore part of a discursive framework is the division between knowledge which is perceived to be true and that which is considered to be false. Foucault charts the history of this division, stating that for Greeks in the sixth century, the content of a statement was no guarantee of its being true; rather, the circumstances under which it was said were of prime importance: 'a day came when the truth was displaced from the ritualised efficacious and just act of enunciation, towards the utterance itself, its meaning, its form, its object, its relation to its reference' (Foucault, 1981: 54). Foucault calls this transition a movement towards the 'will to truth', 'which imposed on the knowing subject, and in some sense prior to all experience, a certain position, a certain gaze and a certain function (to see rather than to read, to verify rather than to make commentaries on)' (Foucault, 1981: 55).

An illustration of this shift within Western cultures can be found in the work of Lennard Davis, who has shown that within the eighteenth century there was a transition from a certain laxity towards the division between fact and fiction, truth and falsehood, to an obsessive and legalistic compartmentalising of the division (Davis, 1983). With the beginning of the production of 'news', that is, texts which purported to be recent, accurate representations of noteworthy events rather than representations of events which had a moral, symbolic or wider religious significance, there began to be forged a division between truth and falsehood within the public domain which was supported and enacted through government intervention, through the introduction of libel laws and stamp duties on certain types of publications. This had a far-reaching effect on the production of texts in general, and it is at this time that the distinction between novels and 'factual' accounts begins to be made. Foucault demonstrates that this will to truth is supported by a range of institutions: educational establishments, publishing houses, legal institutions, libraries, and so on, to the point that it is almost impossible to question this obsession with

the truth and the factual.[4] We assume that this is necessarily a distinction which must guide our thinking. Foucault shows the way that this led in literature within the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to an obsession with *vraisemblance*, to demonstrating that what was written was a 'copy' of external reality. This concern to produce 'true' representations seems to many self-evident, and the search for 'truth' seems to some a possible goal for academic study. Whilst we often experience this will-to-truth as 'a richness, a fecundity, a gentle and insidiously universal force . . . we are unaware of the . . . prodigious machinery designed to exclude' (Foucault, 1981: 56). Exclusion is, in essence, paradoxically, one of the most important ways in which discourse is produced.

CIRCULATION OF DISCOURSES

In addition to these exclusionary procedures, Foucault remarks that the constitution of discourses also has internal mechanisms, which keep certain discourses in existence. The first of these circulatory mechanisms is commentary. Those discourses which are commented upon by others are the discourses which we consider to have validity and worth:

> we may suspect that there is in all societies, with great consistency, a kind of gradation among discourses: those which are said in the ordinary course of days and exchanges, and which vanish as soon as they have been pronounced; and those which give rise to a certain number of new speech acts which take them up, transform them or speak of them, in short, those discourses which, over and above their formulation, are said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again.
>
> (ibid.: 57)

The Bible (itself considered by some to be a set of commentaries) could be considered a text of this nature, upon which commentaries

have been written and will continue to be written; in a sense, these commentaries keep the Bible in existence, ensure that it keeps in circulation as legitimate knowledge. Commentary attributes richness, density and permanence to the text at the very moment when it is creating those values by the act of commentary. But this is not an entirely selfless act:

> commentary's role . . . is to say at last what was silently articulated 'beyond' the text. By a paradox which it always displaces but which it never escapes, the commentary must say for the first time, what had, nonetheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what had, however, never been said.
>
> (ibid.: 58)

This reminds one of the types of strategies adopted by more conventional literary critics when they attempted to articulate the true meaning of a literary text. New Critics, for example, felt that they had to produce a new, better, more comprehensive interpretation of the literary text, whilst arguing that this meaning was embedded in the text already, waiting to be discovered by a particularly skilled reader or critic. Within a Foucauldian view, this process of trying to 'discover' the 'real' meaning of the text is simply an illusory practice, which keeps texts in circulation.

This process whereby texts are kept in circulation by commentary on them is particularly important to consider within the sphere of literary criticism within universities and schools. Critical analysis by theorists is thus not a simple act of research but, as feminist theorists have shown, has an effect on which texts are considered worthy of publication and which ones are then maintained in print. All researchers within literary studies recognise that one accrues status to oneself by working on valued texts: that is, canonical primary texts and/or theoretically complex works. Because of this tendency to work on canonical texts, those texts which have been excluded from the canon tend not to be seen as worthy of analysis. Thus, feminist critics in the 1960s not only had

difficulty accessing early texts by women, they also had difficulties in establishing the legitimacy of such study (Showalter, 1977). Non-canonical texts are often not in print and are therefore difficult for the student or researcher to access, and lecturers are loath to include them on reading lists. Thus, commentary serves not only to ensure that certain texts will always be in print, will always be taught in educational establishments and will always be worked upon by researchers, but it also makes it very difficult to institute the analysis of those texts about which little has been written.

A second internal regulator of discourse is the notion of the academic discipline: this is a larger-order discursive grouping which determines what can be said and regarded as factual or true within a given domain. Thus, each discipline will determine what methods, form of propositions and arguments, and domain of objects will be considered to be true. This set of structures allows for new propositions to be articulated, but only within certain discursive limits. Foucault would argue that the structures of disciplines exclude more propositions than they enable (as all who have attempted to carry out interdisciplinary work will have found). Even if your research work is factually accurate or insightful, if it does not accord with the form and content of particular disciplines it is likely to be disregarded, or to be regarded as non-academic or popular. Disciplines allow people to speak 'in the true', that is, within the realm of what is considered true within that discipline, but they also exclude from consideration other knowledges which might have been possible. For example, if an archaeologist writes an academic paper, because of disciplinary structures, their focus of study would necessarily be on human society and change; but archaeologists often unearth data which could more readily be considered to be the result of environmental change rather than of human acts. If an archaeologist encounters a site where there is evidence of soil erosion or fire damage, they are likely to interpret those traces as evidence of human activity: humans planted crops and caused the soil to erode; humans used

fire to clear a site of trees. If a physical geographer encountered the same traces in a site, they would be more likely to see them as evidence of environmental activity: rivers eroded the soil; the site is subject to spontaneous fire damage. Thus, the discipline in this case determines how this data is classified. Disciplinary structures do not simply demarcate certain types of knowledge as belonging to particular domains, but also lead to the construction of distinct methodologies for analysis, and even within university campuses to buildings devoted to each discipline, so that philosophers, psychologists, linguists and semioticians who are all engaged in the study of the same object – language – do not in fact discuss their perspectives with each other.

Foucault focuses finally on the rarefaction of discourse as an internal discursive constraint. What he means by rarefaction is the surprising fact that although the utterances which could be produced by any one person are theoretically infinite, in fact, they are remarkably repetitive and remain within certain socially agreed-upon boundaries. In theory, any person could utter anything that they wanted to, but, firstly, people tend to remain, in the choice of their topics of conversation and in the words that they choose, fairly restricted by societal and personal norms, and secondly, people tend to be fairly restricted in terms of the construction of their own desires and needs. So what we find ourselves wanting to say falls within fairly predictable and restricted sets of parameters. An analogy might be with the fashion system: there are a limited number of garment styles, fabrics and colours available in the shops for us to buy. We structure our desires about the type of image of ourselves which we would like to project within the boundaries of what is available to us. Those choices we make about clothes nevertheless *feel* personal. Foucault would suggest that these limits are set up by discursive limits; we speak and act within the bounds of what discourses map out for us. We do not, for example, wear no trousers, unless wearing no trousers has been established as discursively acceptable and possible. An ideological analysis of the fashion industry would focus on the interests which are served by this limitation of the possibilities of expression, and Foucault is certainly clear that discursive limitations are those which are sanctioned by an institution of some kind. He is less concerned, however, with the interests which are served by these limitations than he is with the effects on expression that these limitations have.

Discourse is bounded about by rituals which limit the number of people who can utter certain types of utterance: for example, only a priest or registrar can legally marry a couple; only the monarch can open Parliament. If someone who is not sanctioned uttered the same words, the statement would not have an effect; thus, an actor who 'marries' someone on stage is not legally married to them. Foucault asks: 'What, after all, is an education system, other than a ritualization of speech, a qualification and fixing of the roles for speaking subjects, the constitution of a doctrinal group, however diffuse, a distribution and an appropriation of discourse with its powers and knowledges?' (Foucault, 1981: 64) Thus, rather than the education system being seen as an enlightening institution where free enquiry after the truth is encouraged, Foucault sees it rather as simply a form of regulation of discourse. There are strict speaking rights within educational institutions (for example, only the lecturer speaks within a lecture and all other speech is seen as aberrant unless sanctioned by the lecturer), and there are also strict rules about what can pass for knowledge (those attempts to express ideas which do not refer to past knowledge, and which are not expressed in the conventional format of the essay or the thesis, are generally stigmatised and are classified as failures).

Conversely, those forms of knowledge which accurately obey the rules of discourse will be ratified. An example of this is a recent spoof academic paper which created a scandal when it transpired, after it had been published, that the paper was in fact a hoax. The paper was entitled 'Transgressing the boundaries:

towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity' and was written by an American, the physicist Alan Sokal of New York University. It was submitted to the cultural studies journal *Social Text* as a spoof. Sokal wished to prove the vacuousness of cultural studies by publishing an article which was in essence meaningless, but which would gesture in the direction of citing the 'correct' theorists, and making the 'right' arguments to fit in with the current orthodoxy within cultural studies. It was accepted, since, as Peter Jones puts it, 'It spoke the lingo. That was all that counted. Evaluating the argument was of no interest' (Jones, 1996: 16). Whilst this is clearly an overstatement, the article was indeed accepted for publication because it obeyed the discursive rules prevalent in that discipline.

What makes Foucault's analysis of discourse in 'The order of discourse' so insightful is that he focuses on constraint – the way that we operate within discursive limits – rather than assuming that people are free to express whatever they wish. This focus on constraint may be seen as inherently negative, but when taken together with his later work in *The History of Sexuality*, mentioned in the previous chapter, this sense of constraint can be seen as productive as well as limiting. It is only through this process of constraint that knowledge can be produced.

Foucault's analysis of the author is also important in analysing the structures of discourse, since the author ceases to be the ratifier of the meaning of the text, but becomes a form of organisation for groups of texts. The author is no longer 'the speaking individual who pronounced or wrote a text, but . . . a principle of grouping of discourses, conceived as the unity and origin of their meaning' (Foucault, 1981: 58). Literary critics often use the notion of the author to impose a sense of order and a set of restricted concerns on a range of texts which in fact have little in common. Both Barthes and Foucault proposed the 'death' of the author, suggesting a shift away from a concern with the author herself, to a concern with: in Barthes' case, the role of the reader in the

production of an interpretation of a text, and in Foucault's case, the function of the author in the process of making global statements about diverse texts (Foucault, 1980b; Barthes, 1986). Foucault examines the way that some discourses have authors whilst for others the concept of authorship is almost irrelevant; a legal document is not authored, since its authority springs from the institution, the government who sanctions it, rather than from the individual who wrote and edited it. An advertisement is not authored because it is seen as ephemeral and created by groups/teams of people rather than one single person. But literary texts are perhaps the texts which are most clearly categorised as authored texts, even though their creative ownership is problematic, since literary texts are formed more than any other texts in reaction to and within the constraints set up by other literary texts. Literary texts are, also, perhaps the most intertextual of all texts, referring to other texts in terms of literary allusion, and in terms of their formal structures (narrative voice, plot, character, and so on), and yet these are the texts where the creativity of a single author is held to be paramount. Nineteenth-century Romantic notions of the creative artist inform our sense of literary authorship. As Diane Macdonnell states: 'The concept of an "author" as a free creative source of the meaning of a book belongs to the legal and educational forms of the liberal humanist discourse that emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; it is not a concept that exists within discourses that have developed recently' (Macdonnell, 1986: 3). Foucault questions the notion of creativity, arguing that it is rare for something original to be said, and even when a new idea is produced, it is produced within the constraints of what has previously been thought; furthermore, when a new idea is developed, Foucault questions the idea of ownership – there are so many other factors involved in the production of new ideas than the person themselves. Thus, a Foucauldian analysis would focus on the conditions of acceptance of new ideas and would perhaps attempt to analyse those

ideas and inventions which were not sanctioned by a society and which were not classified by society as acceptable within its frames of reference.

An example of this would be the ideas of Francis Bacon, who noticed that the coasts of America and Eurasia seemed to fit into one another, and he assumed that at one time these two land masses had been joined together, thus prefiguring by four centuries the theory of plate tectonics. What Bacon lacked was a way of explaining the mechanism whereby such a movement might have taken place. His idea about the relation between the two coastlines was therefore disregarded; in scientific discourse it is not acceptable either to be so novel or to be right but for the wrong reasons.

Foucault is not arguing that there are no creative individuals. He is arguing instead that all individuals are potentially creative within the discursive constraints which enable ideas and texts to be produced. Most people have their creativity sapped at a very early age by society's pressures on them to conform through the education system. Perhaps he is questioning the simple assumption that the population is divided into a very tiny group of geniuses, such as Einstein, Shakespeare and da Vinci, and the rest of the population, who are not capable of creative thought (thought which challenges the parameters of the discursive constraints).

Rather than focusing on the author, Foucault focuses instead on the author-function, that principle of organisation which operates to group together disparate texts which often have very few common features. Thus, for example, Jane Austen's oeuvre is given a coherence and spoken of in terms of progression from the early novels to the later novels, and epithets such as 'immature' and 'mature' are used to describe this progress. In a similar fashion, Shakespeare's works are grouped together and discussed in terms of their common stylistic features, even though the authorship of some of the plays and poems is in doubt. This narrative of progress and the notion of an oeuvre is one which Foucault

questions, since he asks whether this is in fact an order which we impose on the text given our knowledge of biographical information. In terms of literary texts, Foucault's critique of the author is insightful, since it enables us to move away from analysing texts in terms of the author's life, which for Foucault would be another and different set of texts.

All of these mechanisms for the structuring, constraining and circulation of information have a similar effect: they bring about the production of discourse, but only certain types of discourse. In a sense, they ensure that what can be said and what can be perceived to count as knowledge is very limited and occurs within certain very clearly delimited and recognised bounds. This ensures that the knowledge produced within a particular period has a certain homogeneity. That is not to suggest that all of the individuals existing within a certain era agree on a particular view of the world, but simply that all of the sanctioned utterances and texts are produced within similar discursive constraints.

CONCLUSIONS

What we can draw from this structuralist phase within both Barthes' and Foucault's work on discursive structures is the sense of discourse being composed of a set of unwritten regulations. The rules for the production of discourse do not seem necessarily to be composed by any one person, or group of people, and do not seem to be produced in the interests of any particular group, although they may in fact serve those interests. This arbitrariness of discursive structures is, for many, disconcerting; here we have the sense of our thoughts and utterances not simply springing from our own individual will/volition; instead we see that what we can express and what we think we might want to express is constrained by systems and rules which are in some senses beyond human control. These systems are ones which we are not necessarily aware of, and it is only through the type of archaeological

work which Foucault and Barthes have initiated that we can begin to be aware of the frameworks within which discourse is produced and within which we construct our utterances and thoughts. Post-structuralist and postmodernist theory has largely undermined much of the theoretical underpinning of structuralism, questioning the existence of structures as a whole. However, this early work by Barthes and Foucault was fundamental in forcing us to consider the provenance of the very apparatus within which we think.

NOTES

1 I give a fuller definition of the statement later in this chapter.
2 Norman Fairclough's work on change in discursive structures is interesting in this respect, since he gives detailed accounts of small-scale change to current epistemes (Fairclough, 1992b).
3 Foucault is not concerned with this pragmatic understanding of individual utterances; far more than Austin or Searle, it is not individual utterances which are his focus of attention, but the rules which govern the production of utterances in general, and the limits of what can be expressed (see Searle, 1979).
4 Even the coining of the term 'factional' masks our sense of unease in the twentieth century with texts which do not fit easily into one category or another.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Althusser, Louis (1984) *Essays on Ideology*, Verso, London.

Armstrong, Nancy and Tennenhouse, Leonard (eds) (1987) *The Ideology of Conduct: Essays in Literature and the History of Sexuality*, Methuen, London.

Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth and Tiffin, Helen (1989) *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures*, Routledge, London.

Austin, John (1962) *How to do Things with Words*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Baldick, Chris (1983) *The Social Mission of English Criticism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Baker-Miller, Jean (1978) *Towards a New Psychology of Women*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Bakshi, Parminder (1994) 'The politics of desire: E. M. Forster's encounters with India', in Davies, Tony and Wood, Nigel (eds) *A Passage to India: Theory in Practice*, Open University, Buckingham: 23–64.

Barthes, Roland (1986) 'The death of the author', in Barthes, *The Rustle of Language*, Blackwell, Oxford: 49–55.

—— (1990) *Fragments: A Lover's Discourse*, trans. Richard Howard, Penguin, London (first published 1977).

Bartky, Sandra (1988) 'Foucault, femininity and the modernization of patriarchal power', in Diamond, Irene and Quinby, Lee (eds) *Foucault and Feminism: Reflections of Resistance*, North Eastern University Press, Boston: 61–117.

Bate, Gavin (1992) 'Lessons in life', *Observer*, (supplement) June: 15.

Bell, David, Binnie, John, Cream, Julia, and Valentine, Gill (1994) 'All hyped up and no place to go', *Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography*, Vol.1, No.1: 31–34.

Belsey, Catherine (1980) *Critical Practice*, Methuen, London.

—— (1992) 'Materialist feminist criticism', paper given in the Gillian Skirrow Annual Lecture series, Strathclyde University, Glasgow.

Benveniste, Emile (1971) *Problems in General Linguistics*, University of Miami Press, Florida (first published 1966).

Bhabha, Homi (1994a) *The Location of Culture*, Routledge, London.

—— (1994b) 'Of mimicry and man: the ambivalence of colonial discourse', in Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, Routledge, London: 85–93.

Brazil, David (1975) *Discourse Intonation*, Discourse Analysis Monographs 1, English Language Research, University of Birmingham, Birmingham.

Brazil, David, Coulthard, Malcolm and Johns, Catherine (eds) (1980) *Discourse Intonation and Language Teaching*, Longman, Harlow.

Brown, Gillian and Yule, George (1983) *Discourse Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Brown, Penelope and Levinson, Stephen (1978) 'Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena', in Goody, Esther (ed.) *Questions and Politeness: Strategies in social interaction*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 56–324.

Burton, Deirdre (1980) *Dialogue and Discourse: A Sociolinguistic Approach to Modern Drama Dialogue and Naturally Occurring Conversation*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

—— (1982) 'Through dark glasses, through glass darkly', in Carter, Ronald (ed.), *Language and Literature*, Allen & Unwin, London: 195–214.

Butler, Judith (1990) *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, Routledge, London.

Caldas-Coulthard, Carmen (1995) 'Man in the news: the misrepresentation of women speaking in news-as-narrative-discourse,' in Mills, Sara

(ed.) *Language and Gender: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Longman, Harlow: 226–240.

Caldas-Coulthard, Carmen and Coulthard, Malcolm (eds) (1996) *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, Routledge, London.

Cameron, Deborah (ed.) (1990) *The Feminist Critique of Language: A Reader*, Routledge, London.

—— (1994) 'Words, words, words: the power of language', in Dunant, Sarah (ed.) *The War of the Words: The Political Correctness Debate*, Virago, London: 15–34.

Carrington, Dorothy (ed.) (1949) *The Traveller's Eye*, Pilot Press, London.

Carter, Ron and Simpson, Paul (eds) (1989) *Language, Discourse and Literature: An Introductory Reader in Discourse Stylistics*, Unwin Hyman, London.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh (1988) 'Conditions for knowledge of working-class conditions: employers, government and the jute workers of Calcutta, 1890–1940', in Guha, Ranajit and Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (eds) *Selected Subaltern Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 179–233.

Cliff, Tony (1984) *Class Struggle and Women's Liberation: 1640 to the Present Day*, Bookmarks, London.

Coates, Jennifer (1989) 'Gossip revisited: language in all-female groups', in Coates, J. and Cameron, D. (eds) *Women in their Speech Communities*, Longman, Harlow.

Coates, Jennifer and Cameron, Deborah (eds) (1989) *Women in their Speech Communities*, Longman, Harlow.

Collins Concise English Dictionary (1988) ed. Hanks, Patrick, Collins, Glasgow.

Collins Robert Concise French Dictionary (1990) ed. Atkins, Beryl *et al.*, Collins, Glasgow.

Cook, Guy (1992) *The Discourse of Advertising*, Routledge, London.

Coulthard, Malcolm (1977) *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis*, Longman, London.

—— (ed.) (1992) *Advances in Spoken Discourse Analysis*, Routledge, London.

—— (ed.) (1994) *Advances in Written Text Analysis*, Routledge, London.

Coulthard, Malcolm and Montgomery, Martin (eds) (1981) *Studies in Discourse Analysis*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Couzens Hoy, David (ed.) (1986) *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Crowley, Tony (1989) *The Politics of Discourse: The Standard Language Question in British Cultural Debates*, Macmillan, London.

Crystal, David (1987) *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Language*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Darian-Smith, Kate, Gunner, Liz and Nuttall, Sarah (eds) (1996) *Text, Theory, Space: Land, Literature and History in South Africa and Australia*, Routledge, London.

David-Neel, Alexandra (1983) *My Journey to Lhasa*, Routledge, London.

Davis, Lennard (1983) *Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Diamond, Irene and Quinby, Lee (eds) (1988) *Foucault and Feminism: Reflections of Resistance*, North Eastern University Press, Boston.

Van Dijk, Teun, (ed.) (1985) *Handbook of Discourse Analysis: Volume 3, Discourse and Dialogue*, Academic Press, London and San Diego.

Doyle, Brian (1982) 'The hidden history of English studies', in Widdowson, P. (ed.) *Re-reading English*, Methuen, London: 17–31.

Dreyfus, Herbert and Rabinow, Paul (1982) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Harvester, Brighton.

Dunant, Sarah (ed.) (1994) *The War of the Words: The Political Correctness Debate*, Virago, London.

Eagleton, Terry (1983) *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

—— (1991) *Ideology: An Introduction*, Verso, London.

Eichenbaum, Luise and Orbach, Susie (1982) *Outside In: Inside Out – Women's Psychology: A Feminist Psychoanalytical Approach*, Pelican, Harmondsworth.

Fabian, Johannes (1983) *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Fairclough, Norman (1989) *Language and Power*, Longman, London.

—— (ed.) (1992a) *Critical Language Awareness*, Longman, Harlow.

—— (1992b) *Discourse and Social Change*, Polity, London.

—— (1995) *Media Discourse*, Edward Arnold, London.

Flint, Kate (1993) *The Woman Reader 1837–1914*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Forster, E. M. (1924) *A Passage to India* (1979 reprint), Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Foucault, Michel (1970) *The Order of Discourse: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, Tavistock, London.

—— (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. Sheridan Smith, A. M., Tavistock, London (first published 1969)

—— (1977a) *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Bouchard, D. F. and trans. Bouchard D. F. and Sherry, S., Blackwell, Oxford.

—— (1977b) 'The political function of the intellectual', *Radical Philosophy*, No. 17: 12–14.

—— (1978) *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, Vol. I, Penguin, Harmondsworth (first published 1972).

—— (1979a) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Vintage/Random House, New York.

—— (1979b) 'Interview with Lucette Finas', in Morris, Meaghan and Patton, Paul (eds) *Michel Foucault: Power/Truth/Strategy*, Feral Publications, Sydney: 67–75.

—— (1979c) 'The life of infamous men', in Morris, Meaghan and Patton, Paul (eds) *Michel Foucault: Power/Truth/Strategy*, Feral Publications, Sydney: 76–91.

—— (1979d). 'Powers and strategies: interview between Michel Foucault and Revoltes Logiques collective', in Morris, Meaghan and Patton, Paul (eds) *Michel Foucault: Power/Truth/Strategy*, Feral Publications, Sydney: 48–58.

—— (1979e) 'Truth and power: an interview with Alessandro Fontano and Pasquale Pasquino', in Morris, Meaghan and Patton, Paul (eds) *Michel Foucault: Power/Truth/Strategy*, Feral Publications, Sydney: 29–48.

—— (1980a) *Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews 1972–77*, ed. Gordon, C., Harvester, Brighton.

—— (1980b) 'What is an author?' in Harari, J. V. (ed.) *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism*, Methuen, London.

—— (1981) 'The order of discourse', in Young, Robert (ed.) *Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader*, RKP, London.

—— (1985) *The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure*, Vol. II, Penguin, Harmondsworth (first published 1984).

Fowler, Roger (1981) *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press*, Routledge, London.

Fowler, Roger, Hodge, Robert, Kress, Gunther and Trew, Tony (1979) *Language and Control*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Frow, John (1985) 'Discourse and power', in *Economy and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 2, May: 192–214.

Fuss, Diana (1990) *Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference*, Routledge, London.

Gilroy, Paul (1987) *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, Routledge, London.

Graham, Elspeth, Hinds, Hilary, Hobby, Elaine and Wilcox, Helen (eds) (1989) *Her Own Life: Autobiographical Writings by Seventeenth Century Englishwomen*, Routledge, London.

Guha, Ranajit and Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (eds) (1988) *Selected Subaltern Studies*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Hacking, Ian (1986) 'The archaeology of Foucault', in Couzens Hoy, D. (ed.) *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford: 27–40.

Hanbury-Tenison, Robin (ed.) (1993) *The Oxford Book of Exploration*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hawthorn, Jeremy (1992) *A Concise Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory*, Edward Arnold, London.

Hennessy, Rosemary (1993) *Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse*, Routledge, London.

Hobby, Elaine (1988) *Virtue of Necessity: English Women's Writing 1649–1688*, Virago, London.

Hodge, Robert and Kress, Gunther (1988) *Social Semiotics*, Polity, London.

Hoey, Michael (1983) *On the Surface of Discourse*, Allen & Unwin, London.

Holmes, Janet (1995) *Women, Men and Politeness*, Longman, Harlow.

Hulme, Peter (1986) *Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean 1492–1797*, Methuen, London.

Jones, Peter (1996) 'Academic jargon: how to publish it', *The Times*, 25 May: 16.

Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, trans. Moore, Winston and Cammack, Paul, Verso, London.

Landry, Donna and MacLean, Gerald (1993) *Materialist Feminisms*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Laws, Sophie (1990) *Issues of Blood: The Politics of Menstruation*, Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Lee, David (1992) *Competing Discourses: Perspective and Ideology in Language*, Longman, Harlow.

Longman Dictionary of the English Language (1984) ed. Gay, Heather *et al.*, Longman, Harlow.

Lovell, Terry (1980) *Pictures of Reality: Aesthetics, Politics and Pleasure*, BFI, London.

Lovering, Kathryn Matthews (1995) 'The bleeding body: adolescents talk about menstruation', in Wilkinson, Sue and Kitzinger, Celia (eds) *Feminism and Discourse*, Sage, London: 10–31.

Low, Gail Ching-Liang (1996) *White Skin Black Masks: Representation and Colonialism*, Routledge, London.

McClintock, Anne (1995) *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Imperial Contest*, Routledge, London.

Macdonnell, Diane (1986) *Theories of Discourse*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Macey, David (1993) *The Lives of Michel Foucault*, Verso, London.

Macmillan, Margaret (1988) *Women of the Raj*, Thames & Hudson, London.

McNay, Lois (1992) *Foucault and Feminism*, Polity Press, Oxford.

Mey, Jacob (1993) *Pragmatics: An Introduction*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Mills, Sara (1991) *Discourses of Difference: Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism*, Routledge, London.

—— (1992a) 'Discourse competence: or how to theorise strong women speakers', *Hypatia*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring: 4–17.

—— (1992b) 'Negotiating discourses of femininity', *Journal of Gender Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3, May: 271–285.

—— (ed.) (1994a) *Gendering the Reader*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.

—— (1994b) 'Knowledge, gender and empire', in Blunt, Alison and Rose, Gillian (eds) *Writing Women and Space: Colonial and Post-colonial Geographies*, Guilford, New York: 29–50.

—— (1994c) 'Representing the unrepresentable: Alice Jardine's *Gynesis* and E. M. Forster's *A Passage to India*', in Davies, Tony and Wood, Nigel (eds) *A Passage to India: Theory in Practice*, Open University Press, Buckingham: 121–143.

—— (1995a) 'Discontinuity and post-colonial discourse', *Ariel: A Review of International English Literature*, Vol. 26, No. 3, July: 73–88.

—— (1995b) *Feminist Stylistics*, Routledge, London.

—— (ed.) (1995c) *Language and Gender: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Longman, Harlow.

—— (1996a) 'Colonial domestic space', *Renaissance and Modern Studies*, special issue on gender and space, Vol. 39: 46–60.

—— (1996b) 'Gender and colonial space', *Gender, Place and Culture*, Vol. 3, No. 2: 125–147.

—— (1996c) 'Post-colonial feminist theory', in Mills, Sara and Pearce, Lynne (eds) *Feminist Readings/Feminists Reading*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead: 257–279.

—— (1996d) 'Powerful talk', unpublished discussion paper, Loughborough University.

Mills, Sara and Pearce, Lynne (eds) (1996) *Feminists Reading/Feminist Readings* (2nd, revised, edition), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.

Mills, Sara and White, Christine (forthcoming) 'Discursive categories and desire', in Harvey, K. and Shalom, C. (eds) *Language and Desire*, Routledge, London.

Moi, Toril (ed.) (1986) *The Kristeva Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Morris, James (1979a) *Heaven's Command: An Imperial Progress*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

—— (1979b) *Farewell the Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

—— (1979c) *Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Morris, Meaghan (1979) 'The pirate's fiancée', in Morris, Meaghan and Patton, Paul (eds) *Michel Foucault: Power/Truth/Strategy*, Feral Publications, Sydney: 148–168.

—— (1989) *The Pirate's Fiancée*, Verso, London.

Morris, Meaghan and Patton, Paul (eds) (1979) *Michel Foucault: Power/Truth/Strategy*, Feral Publications, Sydney.

Palmer, Paulina (1989) *Contemporary Women's Fiction*, Harvester, Hemel Hempstead.

Patton, Paul (1979) 'Of power and prisons', in Morris, Meaghan and Patton, Paul (eds) *Michel Foucault: Power/Truth/Strategy*, Feral Publications, Sydney: 109–146.

Pecheux, Michel (1982) *Language, Semantics and Ideology*, Macmillan, Basingstoke (first published in French in 1975).

Porter, Bernard (1968) *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895–1914*, Macmillan, London.

Porter, Dennis (1982) 'Orientalism and its problems', in Barker, F. (ed.) *The Politics of Theory*, Proceedings of the Essex Sociology of Literature Conference, University of Essex, Colchester.

Poster, Mark (1984) *Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production vs. Mode of Information*, Polity Press, London.

Potter, Jonathan and Wetherell, Margaret (1987) *Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour*, Sage, London.

Pratt, Mary Louise (1985) 'Scratches on the face of the country: or what Mr. Barrows saw in the land of the Bushmen', *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No.1, Autumn: 119–143.

—— (1992) *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, Routledge, London.

Rabinow, Paul (ed.) (1984) *The Foucault Reader*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Richards, Thomas (1993) *The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire*, Verso, London.

Said, Edward (1978) *Orientalism*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

—— (1993) *Culture and Imperialism*, Chatto & Windus, London.

Sawicki, Jana (1991) *Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power and the Body*, Routledge, London and New York.

Searle, John (1979) *Speech Acts*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Sharpe, Jenny (1993) *Allegories of Empire: The Figure of Woman in the Colonial Text*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Sheridan, Alan (1980) *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*, Tavistock, London.

Showalter, Elaine (1977) *A Literature of their Own: British Women Novelists from Bronte to Lessing*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

—— (1987) *The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture*, Virago, London.

Shuttle, Penelope and Redgrove, Peter (1978) *The Wise Wound: Menstruation and Everywoman*, Gollancz, London.

Sinclair, John and Coulthard, Malcolm (1975) *Towards an Analysis of Discourse: The English Used by Pupils and Teachers*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Smart, Barry (1985) *Michel Foucault*, Tavistock, London.

Smith, Dorothy (1990) *Texts, Facts and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling*, Routledge, London.

Spender, Dale (1980) *Man Made Language*, RKP, London.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1988) *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*, Routledge, London.

—— (1990) *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*, ed. Sarah Harasym, Routledge, London.

—— (1993a) 'Can the subaltern speak?', in Williams, Patrick and Chrisman, Laura (eds) *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead: 66–111.

—— (1993b) *Outside in the Teaching Machine*, Routledge, London.

—— (1995) 'Three women's texts and a critique of imperialism', in Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth, and Tiffin, Helen (eds) *The Post-colonial Studies Reader*, Routledge, London: 269–273.

Steel, Flora Annie and Gardiner, Grace (1891) *The Complete Indian Housekeeper and Cook*, Heinemann, London, (first published 1888).

Stubbs, Michael (1983) *Discourse Analysis: The Sociolinguistic Analysis of Natural Language*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Sunderland, Jane (ed.) (1994) *Exploring Gender: Questions and Implications for English Language Education*, Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead.

Tannen, Deborah (1990) *You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation*, William Morrow, New York.

Taylor, Charles (1986) 'Foucault on freedom and truth', in Couzens Hoy, D. (ed.) *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Threadgold, Terry (1988) 'Stories of race and gender: an unbounded discourse' , in Birch, D. and O'Toole, M. (eds) *Functions of Style*, Pinter, London.

—— (1997) *Feminist Poetics: Poetics, Performance, Histories*, Routledge, London.

Trew, Tony (1979a) 'Theory and ideology at work', in Fowler, R. *et al.*, *Language and Control*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 94–116.

—— (1979b) 'What the papers say: linguistic variation and ideological difference', in Fowler, R. *et al.*, *Language and Control*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 117–156.

Vetterling-Braggin, M. (ed.) (1981) *Sexist Language: a Modern Philosophical Analysis*, Littlefield Adams, Totowa, N.J.

Vice, Sue (ed.) (1996) *Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reader*, Polity, London.

Voloshinov, Valentin (1973) *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, trans. Matejka, L. and Titunik,-I., Seminar Press, New York (first published 1930).

Walby, Sylvia (1990) *Theorizing Patriarchy*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Walzer Michael (1986) 'The politics of Michel Foucault', in Couzens Hoy, D. (ed.) *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford: 51–68.

Wetherell, Margaret and Potter, Jonathan (1992) *Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.

Whitehead, Neil (ed.) (forthcoming) *Walter Ralegh's Discoverie of the Beautiful Empire of Guyana*, Exploring Travel Series, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Wilkinson, Sue (1986) *Feminist Social Psychology*, Open University Press, Milton Keynes.

Wilkinson, Sue and Kitzinger, Celia (eds) (1995) *Feminism and Discourse: Psychological Perspectives*, Sage, London.

Williams, Patrick and Chrisman, Laura (eds) (1993) *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.

Young, Robert (1995) *Colonial Desire: Hybridity, Theory, Culture and Race*, Routledge, London.