

CONSTRUCTING AUTHORITY

BUYERS, SELLERS, AND AUTHORITIES

In this book, I hope to arrive at an improved understanding of authority, which is something—an entity? a phenomenon? a status?—I have come to see as extraordinarily complex, hopelessly elusive, and almost as badly misconstrued in most scholarly discussions as it is in popular parlance. For although there exists a large literature on this topic, it generally runs in one of three ruts. First, there is the project of those political philosophers of neoconservative bent, who took the turbulence of the 1960s as a “crisis of authority” in the face of which they sought to reestablish the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state. Then there is the work of those social psychologists whose memories stretch back to events of the 1930s and 1940s, who are more concerned with dangers posed by the state than those posed to it, and who have used a variety of experimental data to point up the widespread tendency of citizens, even in liberal democracies, to follow authoritarian leaders. Finally, there is the set of sociological discussions that involve a fairly conservative manipulation of the typology introduced by Max Weber, in which Weber’s subtlety and the more brooding, even ironic, qualities of his thought are mostly lost. Two of the three cate-

gories Weber posited as ideal types are thus rapidly disqualified — traditional authority being treated as obsolete, and charismatic authority dangerous — leaving legal-rational authority, the system of the modern bureaucratic state, as the only viable game in town.

In general, I have found a number of works not centrally concerned with the issue of authority a good deal more helpful than those which have it as their prime focus. In this vein, I think particularly of the writings of Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Mikhail Bakhtin, Maurice Bloch, and James Scott, all of whom, in very different fashions, treat authority as an aspect of discourse and are more attentive to its labile dynamics than to its institutional incarnations. I read them as posing a set of interrelated questions: Who is able to speak with authority? Where and how can one produce authoritative speech? What effect does such speech have on those to whom it is addressed? What responses does such speech anticipate? What responses does it allow? And what consequences can unanticipated and disallowed responses have for the construction, exercise, and maintenance of authority?

Given these initiatives, the time seems right for a radical rethinking of authority — radical in the literal sense of returning to the roots. Such an attempt could begin at any number of points, including the obvious piece of etymological reconnaissance through which English “authority” is tracked to its source in Latin *auctoritas*, a word used with many different shades of meaning, usually in connection with the capacity to perform a speech act that exerts a force on its hearers greater than that of simple influence, but less than that of a command. If we are in search of roots, however, we can simplify things somewhat by focusing initially on the sense *auctoritas* has within legal texts, for there the term makes its first appearance and is used with greatest precision. Four types of legal *auctoritas* are specified in Roman law, and three of these reflect the capacity to make consequential pronouncements, that is, to take action through acts of speech that hearers will accept out of respect for the speaker and his (never her!) office. These are the authority of the senate (*auctoritas patrum* or *auctoritas senatus*), that of the emperor (*auctoritas principis*), and that of a trustee or guardian (*auctoritas tutoris*). There is a fourth type of authority, however,

which is called into play within certain sales transactions (*auctoritas venditoris*), and it is this form alone — the one that to our eyes is strangest and least familiar — that is mentioned in the oldest texts, the *Twelve Tables* of Roman Law, which date to the middle of the fifth century B.C.

Specifically, *auctoritas venditoris* figures in the highly formal procedure of *mancipatio* (literally “mancipation”), through which the most valuable and important forms of property — land, livestock, and slaves — were solemnly transferred from a seller to a buyer. In effect a ritual, *mancipatio* was the process through which one person’s claim to these goods — living beings and the means of production — was formally and publicly dissolved (five Roman citizens had to be present and serve as witnesses), while another person’s claim was publicly constructed.

Obviously, for any sale to take place it is necessary for the seller to have ownership of the goods in question, and it is here that *auctoritas* enters the scene. The seller was required to warrant that he had full title to that which he sold, and was further required to guarantee that should his title prove to be invalid, he would not only make full restitution to the buyer but would pay heavy penalties as well. Specialists in Roman law have debated for more than a half a century whether the *auctoritas* of the seller is best understood as his title to the property or the guarantee he offers, but the distinction may be artificial. The best understanding of *auctoritas* in this highly specialized context is one that connects it to the other types of *auctoritas* mentioned above. Accordingly, I would treat it as the capacity to make a consequential pronouncement, and understand *auctoritas venditoris* as the kind of speech — a guarantee of title — that brings a sale to fulfillment. Moreover, it is a speech that magically puts potentially difficult questions to rest. In this instance, the fundamental question implicit in acts of mancipation: Can one human being be the property of another?

AUTHORITY AND AUTHORITIES

These observations may help us transcend a distinction often made between executive and epistemic authority: between the authority of those who are “in authority” (e.g., political leaders,

parents, military commanders) and that of those who are “an authority” (e.g., technical experts, scholars, medical specialists). Although one may distinguish between the ways in which these different types of people come to occupy their positions and the different warrants they are able to produce in support of their authority, what they have in common is precisely that which characterizes the four types of *auctoritas* recognized in Roman law: they have the capacity to produce consequential speech, quelling doubts and winning the trust of the audiences whom they engage. Thus, for example, the speech of executive authorities in its most extreme form is the military command that produces automatic and unquestioning obedience: the similarly extreme speech of epistemic authorities is the kind of pronouncement that ends all debate on a given question.

In practice, the consequentiality of authoritative speech may have relatively little to do with the form or content of what is said. Neither officers’ commands nor experts’ opinions need be artfully phrased or even make sense in order to yield results. (Indeed, the authority of the latter may be enhanced by a certain incomprehensibility.) Similarly, it does not arise out of some quality of the speaker, such as an office or a charisma. Rather, I believe it is best understood in relational terms as the effect of a posited, perceived, or institutionally ascribed asymmetry between speaker and audience that permits certain speakers to command not just the attention but the confidence, respect, and trust of their audience, or—an important proviso—to make audiences act *as if* this were so.

BETWEEN COERCION AND PERSUASION

Authority is often considered in connection with two other categories, persuasion and force—the processes through which one wins others over through acts of discourse or bends them to one’s will through acts or threats of violence. Persuasion and force have been contrasted to one another since antiquity, persuasion generally being understood as the realm of words and the mind, and force that of deeds and the body. Authority, however, is yet a third entity, which remains distinct from persuasion and coercion alike while being related to them in some very specific and suggestive ways.

Although authority and persuasion both operate primarily through the medium of language, this superficial commonality ought not obscure their more fundamental differences. First, it is important to observe that the exercise of authority not only involves but often depends upon the use of nonverbal instruments and media: the whole theatrical array of gestures, demeanors, costumes, props, and stage devices through which one may impress or bamboozle an audience. Second, even when authority does work with and through words, it does so in a very different fashion than persuasion. Thus, one persuades by arguing a case, advancing reasoned propositions, impassioned appeals, and rhetorical flourishes that lead the hearer to a desired conclusion. In contrast, the exercise of authority need not involve argumentation and may rest on the naked assertion that the identity of the speaker warrants acceptance of the speech, as witness the classic pronouncements of paternal authority *in extremis*: “Because *I* said so,” and “Because I’m your father, *that’s* why!”

Anarchists and others have, on occasion, considered such blunt assertions as these to be paradigmatic of authority in general, and have taken them to reveal that by its very nature authority is both unreasoning and unreasonable. Against this charge, others have maintained that, abuses notwithstanding, the proper exercise of authority involves and rests upon what they have come to call “the capacity for reasoned elaboration.” According to this line of analysis, the potential for persuasion is always implicit within authority, which is accepted not just on its own say-so but because it is understood by all concerned that if asked to explain themselves, those in authority could and would do so. Persuasion, then, is a possibility encapsulated within authority and one that may be brought forward upon demand, while authority, conversely, is a time-saving device or a shorthand version of persuasion.

Although this formulation has been widely used to defend authority against the charge of authoritarianism, I believe it is severely flawed. In actual practice the exercise of authority depends less upon the “capacity for reasoned elaboration” as on the *presumption* made by those subject to authority that such a capacity exists, or on their calculated and strategic willingness to pretend they so presume. Authorities need not be able to

explain themselves so long as others are sufficiently cowed or respectful that they do not ask for explanations. Moreover, when an explanation is requested, the situation is transformed in subtle but important ways, for the relation of trust and acceptance characteristic of authority is suspended, at least temporarily, in that moment. If authority involves the willingness of an audience to treat a given act of speech as credible because of its trust in the speaker, then under the sway of authority an audience acts *as if* it had been persuaded, *when in fact it has not*, while accepting the fact that its regard for the speaker obviates the need for persuasion. In contrast, when authority is asked to explain itself and responds to that request by arguing in earnest rather than simply reasserting itself, it ceases to be authority for the moment and becomes (an attempt at) persuasion.

Other transformative possibilities also exist, and if authority's liberal defenders point proudly to its "capacity for reasoned elaboration," they are generally more reticent about another capacity, which it harbors in equal measure: the capacity for repressive violence. The fact that force is implicit within authority, however, and that authority may deploy force rather than argumentation in response to anything it regards—or chooses to regard—as a challenge is something known to all who are involved in the asymmetric relations constitutive of authority: ruler and ruled, officer and private, teacher and student, parent and child. But if force is actually used, or if threats of force are made with anything less than extreme delicacy (a delicacy that insures deniability), authority risks being perceived as a fig leaf of legitimacy that conceals the embarrassment of naked force. And when authority operates (and is seen to operate) on pain and fear rather than on trust and respect, it ceases to be authority and becomes (an attempt at) coercion.

Authority is thus related to coercion and persuasion in symmetrical ways. Both of these exist as capacities or potentialities implicit within authority, but are actualized only when those who claim authority sense that they have begun to lose the trust of those over whom they seek to exercise it. In a state of latency or occultation, persuasion and coercion alike are constitutive parts of authority, but once actualized and rendered explicit they signal—indeed, they are, at least temporarily—its negation.

AUTHORIZED AND AUTHORIZING OBJECTS, TIMES, AND PLACES

Above, I made passing reference to "the whole theatrical array of gestures, demeanors, costumes, props, and stage devices through which one may impress or bamboozle an audience." It would, no doubt, be of interest to consider the myriad trappings that serve this purpose—the precise physical postures and facial expressions that at one time and place or another have been used to convey attitudes of gravity, solemnity, decisiveness, and the like, or the seemingly endless variety of uniforms and insignia (badges, diplomas, special seats, vehicles, headgear, etc.) that are used to mark certain people as distinguished for their rank, status, office, lineage, special training, etc., and which thereby help them lay claim to an audience's attention, respect, and trust.

At a certain level, however, we can dispense with an investigation in detail that would be virtually interminable. For as an iconic emblem (if not as a practical instrument), the judge's gavel is functionally identical to the doctor's stethoscope or the athletic coach's whistle and clipboard. All of these items (and countless others) announce the authority of their bearer for a given audience and within a circumscribed context or sphere of activity. Some emblems, particularly those insignia of office associated with the most sweeping and consequential forms of authority, play a more active role than others in the construction of that authority. Thus, rituals of coronation transform pretenders (a significant title!) into kings by placing the crown on their heads, and priests cease to be priests when they are literally and ceremonially defrocked.

The conventional analysis of such data is that the king's crown and the priest's vestments are arbitrary representations of offices, and authority resides within the office. Those who wear the crown or the robes (like those who wear a policeman's badge, to cite another familiar example) signal to others that they are acting in an official capacity. When they appear without these trappings, they signal that they act with their own personal authority, not that derived from their office. The moment of coronation, then, is the moment when someone is endowed with the authority of the royal office, of which the crown is a

mere sign or emblem, and defrocking is the reverse procedure with regard to the priestly office.

Such a view has much to recommend it, but there are cases that reveal its limitations. Consider the example of impostors and usurpers, who are able to wield authority effectively when they possess the insignia but not the office precisely because the insignia obtain for them the trust of those people who in the moment of trusting become their "subjects." The inverse case—those who hold the office but not the insignia—is exemplified in the story of the emperor's new clothes, which points up the shortcomings of any model that locates authority simply and straightforwardly in the person, the emblem, or the office. Although the emperor's office permitted him to demand that his subjects show their trust by acting as if his absent insignia were present, and although his subjects complied with this demand up to a point (out of respect for his authority), there were very definite limits on their willingness or ability to do so. At the moment when one member of the audience (significantly a child, which is to say, one least schooled in and least intimidated by the ways of authority) gave voice to skepticism, the emperor's authority effectively crumbled. Moreover, that delicious moment reveals to us that offices, insignia, and office holders all advance claims which are most effective and consequential when correlated with one another. When audiences accept these claims—for whatever reason and with whatever measure of sincerity—authority is the result. Finally, it is consistent with our emerging view that authority depends on nothing so much as the trust of the audience, or the audience's strategic willingness to act as if it had such trust.

Returning to the topic of insignia, insofar as a particular garment or piece of paraphernalia has come to enjoy the respect and reverence of a given audience (for whatever reasons), it focuses the attention of that audience on whomever comes to hold it, whose words will consequently be received—initially, at least—with similar respect and reverence. The same is true for certain select times and places. Consider, for example, the pulpit on Sunday mornings, the lectern at the appointed hour for a university class, or the judge's bench when court is in session. Such times and places are authorized, not only by specific institutions (church, university, government), but also by the

memories, associations, assumptions, and expectations they call forth in the audiences they call together. Being authorized by the group, they are able to authorize—i.e., confer authority on—those whom the group permits to speak and that which they say within this setting.

The question of permission is an important one, for most groups treat the opportunity to speak within such places as a scarce and valued resource. Considerations of office, rank, credentials, personal qualities, and qualifications (age, gender, moral character, etc.) can be used to restrict access, but regardless of the specific criteria employed, the general principle remains the same. In order to gain admission, one must be authorized; that is, one must enjoy the confidence and command the trust of the group as a whole, or of those who have been delegated as its gatekeepers. Here it should also be noted that authorization ordinarily carries with it implicit obligations, for the group trusts those whom it expects to be respectful of its sensibilities and values as expressed in the codes of etiquette, decorum, and ritual that determine the kinds of speech and behavior considered appropriate to the setting. Violation of these codes can result in loss of the group's trust, withdrawal of authorization, and expulsion from the privileged sphere.

AUTHORIZED SPEECH AND SIGNIFICANT SILENCE

When an authorized speaker advances to an authorized and authorizing place, the audience falls quiet. This silence ought not to be taken for granted, but ought to prompt a prolonged inquiry. How does this silence come to be? How is it maintained or enforced, and how fully? What does this absence of speech signify? More pointedly, one might ask if it is the speaker (or the speaker's henchmen) who silences an audience, or if an audience silences itself in order that the speaker might speak? Further, is it really the speaker who speaks to the audience in such situations, or does an audience speak to itself through the medium of the speaker? Finally, if we combine the most challenging of these possibilities (although by no means the least probable), we are led to wonder if, at least in those situations where the audience is most respectfully attentive, it might not be silencing itself in order to hear itself speak to itself through

a speaker it takes to be its own representative, delegate, or incarnation?

Silence takes many forms, however, and one needs to take account of the nonverbal behaviors of a silent audience, for these can serve as an indication of the extent to which its members accept and acknowledge the speaker's authority or merely bow to his or her power. Resistance, for example, can take the form of simple inattention or disrespect, as every classroom teacher knows. Such resistance becomes more acute when it is signaled in visible bodily demeanor (yawns, eye-rolling, lounging, etc.) and threatens to spread to others in the audience. When it becomes visible to the speaker, it can amount to—or be taken for—a sign of open defiance.

If upon close examination the silence of the audience proves to be of analytic interest, so too are the moments in which this silence is broken and one begins to experience, albeit vaguely at first, the absence of the audience's speech. Here it is helpful to recall two points: first, as I have repeatedly stressed, the authority of the speaker depends on the trust of the audience (or, alternatively, on the fear that makes an audience act as if it had such trust); and second, an audience has ways of talking to itself that do not require the agency of a speaker. Moreover, an audience has recourse to these ways when it begins to lose trust in those whom it has authorized to speak. Thus, when an audience starts to whisper, the authority of the speaker has been called into doubt, and a speaker who says things sufficiently jarring to cause the audience to mutter has placed his or her authority at risk. Accordingly, speakers who wish to avoid these possibilities—and this accounts for the vast majority—strive to say inconsequential and platitudinous things in a way that makes them sound fresh and stimulating, and to say challenging things in a sufficiently conventional way as to make them sound mild, navigating in this fashion between the twin dangers of shocking and boring their audiences.

CONJUNCTIONS AND DISRUPTIONS

Ultimately I want to suggest that discursive authority is not so much an entity as it is (1) an effect; (2) the capacity for producing that effect; and (3) the commonly shared opinion that a

given actor has the capacity for producing that effect. More precisely, I take the effect to be the result of the conjuncture of the right speaker, the right speech and delivery, the right staging and props, the right time and place, and an audience whose historically and culturally conditioned expectations establish the parameters of what is judged “right” in all these instances. When these crucial givens of the discursive situation combine in such a way as to produce attitudes of trust, respect, docility, acceptance, even reverence, in the audience, or—viewing things from the opposite perspective—when the preexistent values, orientations, and expectations of an audience predispose it to respond to a given speech, speaker, and setting with these reverent and submissive attitudes, “authority” is the result.

Although the preceding discussion may have its uses, it is meant to be no more than a set of preliminary and provisional reflections that may provide the starting point for a more empirically grounded set of inquiries. In the subsequent chapters, it is my intention to study authority not as an abstract concept, but in its concrete occurrences; not as a static entity, but in its dynamics. I am also inclined to think that the best way to study something like authority is not when it operates smoothly and efficiently, for its success in some measure depends on naturalizing itself and obscuring the very processes of which it is the product. Thus, I propose to investigate select moments of crisis. Having come to view authority as the effect produced by a specific conjunction, in chapters 2 through 4 I will consider in detail three episodes in which that conjunction is disrupted, as for example (a) when an unauthorized person starts to speak in the authorized and authorizing sphere (chapter 2); (b) when a fully authorized person is expected to say the wrong thing in such a setting (chapter 3); and (c) when people who are expected to say the wrong thing seek authorization (chapter 4). In all cases, we are able to observe the critical moments of challenge and riposte when actors who are accustomed to enjoying a relative monopoly on the privileged sphere confront the possibility that someone else will make use of it to gain authorization for acts of speech they consider antithetical to their own desires and interests. Just as the nature of the challenges varies in these three cases, so does the nature of the responses. In one instance, the challenging speaker is removed from the privi-


leged sphere (chapter 2); in another, events are manipulated so that he loses his opportunity to speak (chapter 3); and in the third, the nature of the sphere is violently transformed, losing its authorization and its capacity to authorize (chapter 4).

The examples I have chosen are drawn from societies sufficiently removed in time from our own to provide a secure critical distance, but sufficiently connected to us by way of continuing cultural tradition that they may still afford us some feeling of recognition. In selecting these data, I began by identifying the most privileged locus for speech within three societies of ancient and medieval Europe: the Assembly (*agorē*) of the Homeric Greeks, the Roman Senate, and the Germanic *Thing*. I then looked for the most disruptive events said to have occurred within each of these settings. In the first instance, this led me to a work of poetic fiction (the episode of Thersites as recounted in book 2 of the *Iliad*); in the second, to an historic event (Caesar's assassination, as reported by Suetonius, Dio Cassius, and Plutarch); and in the third, to an intermediate form—the literary recasting of history (Egil Skallagrimsson's conflict with the Norwegian king and queen, as preserved in the saga that bears his name).

In all cases I deal with texts, not events themselves, as is always true when one studies the past (and much of the time when one studies the present). And although in the confines of the present work I cannot possibly investigate the question of how *textual* authority is constituted, I still find that my inquiry here turns back on itself, for all the texts I will be treating enjoyed considerable authority within the societies that produced them, that is, their audiences put their trust in these accounts and listened to them attentively, permitting their words to act on them. Accordingly, I am willing to grant these same texts a certain degree of authority at second hand and make use of them, not for the recovery of "actual events," but for the elucidation of what authority was and how it operated within these societies. I trust that these texts said things which their audiences found credible and which we may therefore take to reflect with some accuracy the sociopolitical processes and authority effects with which those people were familiar.

Originally, it was my intention to write a set of conclusions based upon the examples treated in chapters 2–4, and to pres-

ent them in a final chapter. Research never goes precisely according to plan, however, and complex issues have a way—maddening or delightful, depending on one's disposition—of spilling beyond the bounds allotted to them, thereby defying easy closure. As I grappled with the data I had assembled, ever more questions kept arising, some of which have now been given their own chapters: "corrosive" discourses like gossip, rumor, and curses, which eat away at authority (chapter 5); the problematic situation of women (chapter 6); the role of religion in the construction of authority (chapter 7); and the question of whether authority in the modern and postmodern world differs fundamentally, or only superficially, from its pre-modern counterpart (chapters 8 and 9, which take up two further examples).



AGAINST AUTHORITY

Corrosive Discourses

CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY AND VIOLENT RIPOSTES

Even if it were within my power to produce an authoritative account of authority, I would be loath to do so, for I do not claim nor do I wish to be the right kind of speaker for such a project. Rather, I would far prefer to dish up a set of gossip stories, scurrilous comments, and irreverent jokes that have some — perhaps only tangential — bearing on so august a topic. And within the limits of an overly stodgy academic diction, that is what I have tried to do in the last three chapters.

The stories I told there were meant to be juicy and revealing, embarrassing in certain ways (also for certain types of people and interests), liberating in (and for) others. In general I have not attempted to treat authority in the abstract, nor in its essence, but have chosen to focus on a few episodes of crisis to explore the dynamics of authority: to catch authority in moments of revealing disarray, where one can see how it responds to challenge, and how challengers respond to authority's responses. To this end, I began my inquiry by identifying the single most disruptive events attested within three settings, each of which was the prime "authorized and authorizing

place" of a given society: the Homeric assembly (*agorē*), the Roman Senate, and the Scandinavian *Thing*.

Surprisingly, none of these crises involved a frontal assault in which some actors sought to strip others of the authority the latter enjoyed. Rather, they were catalyzed either by the entry of an unauthorized person into the privileged sphere (Thersites, Egil's witnesses), or alternatively, when it appeared that an authorized person (Cotta) would make use of his access to say things judged intolerable. In all cases, the period of crisis ended in violence: violence deployed by people who were determined to prevent an act of speech that threatened not only their interests, but also their relative monopoly on access to the privileged sphere.

Conventional wisdom deplores such violence for the way it puts an end to all opportunities for discussion. While it is hard to be critical of so mild and well-intentioned a view, its inadequacies are clear. First, it makes a special case of violence, which ought to be seen in connection to other, related phenomena. Although the direct exercise of physical force may be rare (and therefore shocking), the threat of force is present in every speech situation, being implicit in the unequal power of those who are parties to it. This threat always inflects and distorts the nature of the speech, creating opportunities for some and restrictions for others. Accordingly, it may be more important to explore (and deplore) the subtle processes of inhibition and intimidation that run through every conversation than to concentrate attention on the relatively few occasions in which the implicit threats of force are spectacularly realized.

Second, even the most flagrant use of force cannot extinguish speech in any absolute sense. At most, violent acts can do no more than deprive certain actors of certain forms of speech and certain opportunities for speaking. In so doing, however, they will surely provoke other sorts of speech (lamentations, accusations, denials, etc.) by other actors in other places and on other occasions. Moreover, if one broadens the notion of "speech" to include signifying practices in general, it follows that even lethal force is incapable of reducing those on whom it falls to absolute silence, for the graves or corpses of the slain, and the absences of the *desaparecidos* themselves become signs

that "speak" what has been done and denounce those responsible.

Finally, violence itself can be understood as a form of speech through which actors announce the power they have and their willingness to use it. As such, it reaches and affects not only those whose bodies feel it directly, but also those who see or hear about it at second and third hand: This, precisely, is the terrorizing effect of terror. Yet it is also important to recognize that those who speak through the medium of force implicitly acknowledge their inability to command the obedience or even the respectful attention of their interlocutors by any less strenuous means. That is to say, in the moment they resort to force, they abandon their claim to authority, and one can thus describe violence as a speech that deligitimates itself in the very act of speaking.

ATTACK AND COUNTERATTACK: AUTHORITY AND ITS CORROSION

In each of the cases I have considered, violence forced the protagonists to retreat from the places they had assumed within the privileged sphere. Beyond this, their actions differed significantly, as did the stances they adopted toward those who drove them out. Thus, Thersites and Cotta accepted defeat: The former returned to his seat and wept, while the latter retired from public life after the Ides of March, explaining to friends that he did so "out of a certain fatal despair" (*fatali quadam desperatione*). In contrast, Egil's immediate, almost instinctive response was to meet violence with violence, and when he found this possibility blocked, he then sought other modes of action.

Alf Shipman and his company leapt into the court. They cut apart the bonds of consecration, broke down the staffs, and set the judges running. Then there was a great tumult in the *Thing*, but all the men were unarmed there. Then Egil said: "Can Berg-Onund hear my words?"

"I hear," he said.

"Then I offer you a duel, and we two will fight, here at the *Thing*. He who gains victory will have the livestock, the land,

and the money. And if you dare not, you will be everyone's object of mockery."

Then King Eirik answered: "If you are eager to fight, Egil, we will grant that to you."

Egil answered: "I will not fight against you, nor against overwhelming numbers of troops. But I will not flee from an equal number of men, if this be granted to me. And in that case, I'll make no distinction among men."

Then Arinbjorn said: "Let us leave. We can't do anything here that helps us at present." Then he turned away, and all his troops went with him.

Then Egil turned back and said: "I call you to witness this, Arinbjorn, and you too, Thord, and all those men who can hear my words now: nobles and lawmen and commoners. I curse all the lands that Bjorn had, curse them for dwelling and for cultivation. I curse you, Berg-Onund, and all other men—native and foreigner, high-born and low—who have done this. I charge you with breaking the laws of the land and with breaking the truce of the *Thing*, and I call down the wrath of the gods." (*Egil's Saga* 56.59–66)

At first, Egil continues to define the situation as a struggle between himself and Berg-Onund, to whom he offers a stark alternative: "I offer you a duel, and we two will fight . . . And if you dare not, you will be everyone's object of mockery" (*hvers manns nið-ingr*). This choice involves several linked alternatives. Berg-Onund can face either Egil or the community at large, but in either case the weapons and the stakes differ sharply. In a duel, the two opponents will use weapons of metal and both will risk their lives equally. Should Berg-Onund decline, however, he will face countless, nameless adversaries, all of whom wield words as their weapons: words of scorn and ridicule (Old Norse *nið*) that inflict wounds of shame, and in this form of combat he alone will take the risks, particularly that of lost reputation.

In effect, Egil asks Berg-Onund to choose between facing physical violence (which, as we have seen, is also a form of speech) and speech, which can also be a form of violence. Berg-Onund is rescued from these bleak alternatives by the king, who insists on his own role in the dispute, and offers to enter

the fray. At this point, bluster notwithstanding, Egil cannot realistically hope to accomplish anything through force of arms. Still, Arinbjorn's counsel of prudence — "We can't do anything for the moment that will serve us" — is less than fully correct, since there *is* something Egil can do, even in the face of superior force. Quite simply, he curses Berg-Onund and King Eirik alike, as he will do once more when planting his "staff of mockery" (*níð-stǫng*).

Ultimately, Egil wins a much larger victory than he could have hoped to achieve in the *Thing*-place or in any court of law. Moreover, he does so by using a blunt, coarse, and caustic speech of calumny and denunciation that is utterly different from the speech of authority, but no less consequential. Within the context of chapter 4, I referred to this as "the fifth voice" to distinguish it from the other voices there at issue: those of the two rival disputants, that of the law, and that of (monarchic) state power. Beyond this specific context, however, we might do better to call this form of speech "corrosive discourse." Under this term might then be included all those sorts of speech which are not only nonauthoritative, but downright antithetical to the construction of authority, given their capacity to eat away at the claims and pretensions of discourses and speakers who try to arrogate authority for themselves: gossip, rumor, jokes, invective; curses, catcalls, nicknames, taunts; caricatures, graffiti, lampoon, satire; sarcasm, mockery, rude noises, obscene gestures, and everything else that deflates puffery and degrades the exalted. Other differences notwithstanding, all of these discourses lead audiences to hold someone or something in diminished regard, and as an audience turns irreverent, authority crumbles.

Ironically, corrosive discourses themselves suffer from a bad name, largely because of their ad hominem quality, although this also gives them much of their piquant appeal. Not only do they concern themselves with specific, named and well-known individuals, they freely delight in their foibles and failings. Virtually nothing is off limits to them, and in tone they can range from jocular innuendo to merciless censure. Charges of sexual impropriety, cowardice, and self-indulgence of various sorts (drunkenness, gluttony, laziness, etc.) are common, since in these both moral and physical shortcomings are equally evi-

dent. Although true, it is quite inadequate to say that they focus on the private, not the public persona. Rather, they focus on the private *at the expense of* the public persona, stressing the inevitable contradictions between the two, as when they — with obvious delight — speak of the body that lurks beneath and brings discredit to the robes or uniform. In short, corrosive discourse restores to the level of the human those frail and fallible individuals who would prefer to represent themselves as the embodiment of some incontestable office or some transcendent ideal.

NOT TO PRAISE, BUT TO BURY

According to the saga that bears his name, Egil was ultimately able to unseat a king through the agency of corrosive discourses. He triumphs where Cotta and Thersites are defeated precisely because he will *not* be silenced, but keeps on speaking. In extremis, he has recourse to a new and different form of speech, a speech with emancipatory potential that is appropriate to and effective within the new situation and position into which he has been thrust. Hardly authoritative, it is a speech that eats away at the authority — and ultimately the power — of those who deprived him of his rights to the other form of speech which originally he sought.

Although Cotta may have been reduced to silence, there were other Romans who traded in corrosive discourse during February and March of 44 B.C. with devastating results. Among these, as we have seen, are the anonymous rumormongers who sowed suspicion about Caesar's motives, prompting the conspirators to kill him, and the invisible graffiti artists who so taunted Brutus that he joined the conspiracy rather than risk the loss of his (and his family's) good name. Several other telling examples may be drawn from the hectic and confused period following Caesar's assassination, when numerous actors sought both to gain authority for themselves and to discredit their rivals, the dead and living alike.

If we follow the conspirators on the Ides of March, we find them alternating between unsuccessful attempts to speak with authority and counterproductive acts of corrosive discourse. Thus, we are told that immediately after the assassination Bru-

tus tried to deliver a formal address on the floor of the Senate to justify their act as a defense of traditional Roman values: *libertas* and the Republic. Unfortunately—but not surprisingly—he found himself in that moment without an audience, since all save the conspirators had fled. Accordingly, he and his comrades marched through the city to the Capitoline hill, waving bloody daggers, parading a liberty cap (the mark of men freed from slavery) on the point of a spear, reviling Caesar as a king and a tyrant, and calling on bystanders to come and join them. Then, on the following day:

The Senators and many of the common people went up to the men on the Capitoline. When the multitude had gathered, Brutus conversed with them in ways that were inviting to the people and fitting to the occasion. When they advised them to come down, Brutus and the others confidently descended to the forum. The other conspirators went together, but many distinguished men escorted Brutus most respectfully from the heights of the Capitoline and installed him on the rostrum. At the sight of him, the masses trembled [*hoi polloi dietresan*]. Although it was a mixed crowd and they were prepared to create a disturbance, they listened to what was forthcoming in perfect order and silence. When he came forward, all were quiet and they gave themselves up to his words. But it became clear that the assassination had not brought pleasure to everyone when Cinna began to speak and to make accusations against Caesar. At that, the crowd broke into a rage and spoke so badly against Cinna that the conspirators withdrew again to the Capitoline. (Plutarch *Brutus* 18.4–6)

Two performances are here contrasted. First, there is that of Brutus, stage-managed by members of the senatorial elite, who install him on the rostrum at the head of the forum—the most privileged position for any public address—in a manner that announces his authority so forcefully that even the most hostile members of the crowd are obliged to give him a courteous hearing. Matters change abruptly, however, when a man who was not so painstakingly identified as the right kind of speaker—Cornelius Cinna, a praetor who owed his office to Caesar—begins to give the wrong sort of speech, abusing Caesar's memory and denouncing his benefactor. At this shift to

corrosive discourse, the crowd recovers its voice. Indeed, its shouts drive Cinna from the rostrum and the conspirators from the forum.

If Brutus and his colleagues fluctuated between attempts at authoritative and corrosive discourse, supporters of Caesar accomplished a more subtle and sophisticated interweaving of the two, most notably in the funeral oration given by Marc Antony on 20 March. Antony spoke from the rostrum, but unlike Brutus, he spoke as the Republic's highest ranking official, for in 44 B.C. he was Caesar's co-consul, as well as his most trusted assistant. Nor was it an impromptu meeting in which he spoke, but a solemn, state funeral authorized by the Senate as part of a compromise voted on the seventeenth which reaffirmed all the honors given and due to Caesar, while also granting amnesty to his assassins. The right speaker, Antony thus spoke at the right time and in the right place, and the nature of his speech was also judged "right" by the large majority of his audience. Still, much of his success resulted from the corrosive elements he skillfully inserted within an act of authoritative discourse.

Accounts differ, and none is more than a paraphrase of what Antony actually said, but of those texts which give anything approaching a full description, Appian's is usually considered the most trustworthy.

When Calpurnius Piso [Caesar's father-in-law, who had been entrusted with his will and his corpse] had borne the body to the forum, a vast multitude drew together to guard it with their weapons. With shouts and great ceremony, they placed it on the rostrum. Again there was lengthy wailing and lamentation. The men at arms clashed their weapons, and they began to repent of the amnesty that had been granted to the assassins. Antony, seeing how things were going, did not change his purpose, but having chosen himself to deliver the eulogy as a consul speaking for a consul, a friend speaking for a friend, and a relative speaking for a relative (since he was related to Caesar on his mother's side), he once more exercised his craft and spoke thus:

"Citizens, it is not fitting that the eulogy of so great a man should be declaimed by me alone, just one person; rather, it should come from his whole country. Insofar as you all voted

honors to him, the Senate and the people being equally admiring of his excellence, I will read these decrees, using your voice and not that of Antony." Then he began to read, with his face both angry and sorrowful, pausing and emphasizing each decree with his voice, especially those which treated Caesar as divine, or which named him sacred and inviolable, father of the fatherland, benefactor, or patron like no other. At each of these, Antony turned his eyes and his hands toward Caesar's body, giving an illustration of his speech through his action. (*Civil Wars* 2.143–44)

At its boldest, Antony's goal was to reshape social sentiments and allegiances, particularly those involving himself, the Senate, and the people. Thus, he is at pains to connect his voice to that of the people so tightly as to make it seem they are virtually one. To this end, he begins by effacing his own voice as he says, "It is not fitting that the eulogy . . . should be declaimed by me alone . . . rather, it should come from his whole country," and "I will read these decrees, *using your voice and not that of Antony*." Over the course of his address, however, Antony gradually repositions himself so that where initially he claims that the people spoke through him, by the end they see him as speaking for the people.

By reading the aforementioned decrees (the extraordinary honors the Senate bestowed on Caesar and reaffirmed in its postassassination meeting of 17 March), Antony also works to drive a wedge between the voice of the Senate and that of the people. When Antony states that "the Senate and the people [*hē te boulē kai . . . ho dēmos*] were equally admiring of [Caesar's] excellence," however, he does so with more than a trace of irony, as is underscored by the gestures and tone of voice he uses while quoting the Senate's resolutions. Through these paralinguistic cues, he insinuates that whereas he and the people of Rome are sincere and loyal in their admiration for Caesar, Caesar's assassins — all senators — were hypocritical and deceitful when they initially voted these honors and, more recently, when they voted to reaffirm them. With this maneuver, he laid the groundwork for transforming the traditional Rome of "Senate and people" (*Senatus populusque Romanus*, S.P.Q.R.) into Rome of the Civil War, in which a Caesarophile faction,

initially consisting of Antony and the people, confronted the faction of Caesaricides centered on the Senate.

Appian goes on to describe how, in subsequent portions of his oration, Antony quoted the oaths sworn by the Senate to defend Caesar; sang hymns to him as if to a celestial deity (*ōs theon ouranion hymnei*); recounted Caesar's victories and other glorious deeds; pitched his voice into a high register, as if speaking in a state of inspiration (*epitheisas*), then dropped it again as he mourned, wept, and vowed his willingness to give his own life in exchange for Caesar's. Then, in the culminating moments:

Completely carried away with passion, he uncovered Caesar's body, and lifting his toga up on a pole, brandished it, torn as it was from the blows of the daggers, and stained with the ruler's blood. At that, the people engaged in the most mournful lamentations with him, singing like the chorus in a tragedy, and out of his sorrow, they were filled once more with anger. (*Civil Wars* 2.146)

Although other versions differ in certain details, they consistently report that the Senate's decrees honoring Caesar were quoted verbatim, as was the oath ensuring Caesar's safety. They also agree there was a display of Caesar's bloody toga, although some say his body was also exhibited, and some speak of a wax effigy, in which all twenty-three wounds were fully evident. Virtually without exception they emphasize how Antony aroused in his audience the sentiments of pity for Caesar and rage or indignation at his murderers.

Here, Antony exposed himself to criticism as he violated the norms of rhetorical practice, under which eulogists were expected to concentrate on evoking admiration for the deceased and for his family. Dio Cassius judged Antony's unveiling of the corpse to be "most unthinkable" (*anoētōtata*), and took the speech itself to be "very beautiful and brilliant, yet not fitting for the occasion." Cicero went further, thundering at Antony in a pamphlet of denunciation that purported to be a speech delivered on the floor of the Senate (i.e., a corrosive discourse masquerading as authoritative).

You presided at the tyrant's funeral (if funeral it was!) in a most infamous fashion. That beautiful eulogy was yours, the appeal

to pity was yours, the incitement was yours. You, I say, you lit those torches—those with which Caesar was only half cremated, and those with which the house of Lucius Bellienus was burned down. You instigated the attacks on our houses by those lost souls—slaves, for the most part—which we repelled by the force of our hands.

FIRE, SWORD, AND INVECTIVE

Here, Cicero gives Antony more than his due. Granted he undercut the conspirators' authority, helped reorganize Rome into Caesaricide and Caesarophile factions, and effectively established his own authority within the latter faction; still, one ought not grant all agency in this volatile moment to him alone. Although some accounts—not least of them Shakespeare's—are written in such a way as to make Antony the puppetmaster and the crowd his marionette, there is no mistaking the fact that the Roman crowd had wishes, agency, and a highly corrosive language of its own, as becomes clear in the tumultuous events to which Cicero made reference.

Antony intended that upon conclusion of his eulogy, Caesar's body would be carried in a spectacular procession to the Field of Mars, where it would be cremated and the ashes buried, in accordance with ancient practices that forbade disposal of a body within the walls of the city. Apparently the people judged these arrangements inadequate and a quarrel broke out. Ultimately, the crowd decided to cremate Caesar in the forum itself as a signal honor, and conceivably part of an attempt to effect his apotheosis. In this act—part ritual and part riot—they dragged tables and benches from nearby shops and set them ablaze. Then, with brands drawn from this improvised pyre, the mob marched on the assassins' houses, burning one down and turning back from others only after pitched battles. On the way back, they encountered Helvius Cinna, a tribune and ardent Caesarophile. They mistook him, however, for Cornelius Cinna, the Caesaricide praetor who had antagonized the crowd when he spoke against the slain Caesar on 16 March. Falling on his hapless namesake, they ripped the man literally limb from limb, and paraded his head through the streets of the city.

This savage act so terrified the conspirators that many of them decided to make an early departure from the city. But the story does not end here. On the day after the funeral a certain Amatius, who also called himself Marius and claimed to be Caesar's cousin, erected an altar at the site of the pyre and offered sacrifices to Caesar, in effect raising him to the status of a deity. Later a memorial column was added, with the inscription "To the Father of the Fatherland." These initiatives potentially had profound consequences, both religious and political. Not only did they create a new piece of sacred space within the topography of Rome, they also established a staging ground where the most militant of Caesar's devotees could be mobilized. Through March and into mid-April an unruly group of men, army veterans and others from the lower orders of Roman society, gathered at Amatius's altar and became the scourge of those conspirators who still had not fled.

In all of this, as Guy Achard has shown in detail, the Roman people called on a rich ensemble of practices from the militant funerals and violent demonstrations they had been staging for almost a century whenever one of their popular champions died at the hands of the senatorial elite (as in the case of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Gaius Marius, Catiline, and Publius Clodius Pulcher). For his part, Antony employed a few select items from the symbolic repertoire of these rituals; above all, the public display of a wounded body. But in their impromptu pyre, incendiary assaults, ad hoc establishment of a new cult place, and continuing violence, the people made fuller use of many more items from the same repertoire, and in so doing they went far beyond anything Antony either wanted or anticipated. Indeed, it was Antony himself who put a violent stop to these practices, for on 13 April he had Amatius arrested, executed without trial, then dragged through the streets on an iron hook and flung in the river Tiber.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

It is hard not to feel some measure of sympathy for poor Amatius on his hook. One can recognize in his brutal treatment a ritual means of execution, in which the bodies of particularly notorious criminals were denied the purifying effects of fire.

Indeed, in such cases it was Rome that needed purification, and the city sought to rid itself of the pollution such people inflicted upon it by dispatching their corpses through the alternate media of water (the Tiber) or air (when they were thrown down from the Tarpeian Rock). Unmistakably, these practices were also intended to degrade and disgrace their victims.

Inflicting disgrace and effecting degradation are complex social processes, however, not transitive actions that can be accomplished by physical means alone. Rather, their accomplishment depends on the judgment of some audience, and it is always the audience that has the last word. Operations intended to disgrace can fail or backfire, as when an audience judges the victims of such treatment to be martyrs and their authors to be bullies.

Apparently, Antony viewed Amatius as a rival for leadership of the Caesarophile faction, and decided to deal with him lest his popularity grew too large and his actions too daring. The reaction to Amatius's repression, as one might have predicted, was different among Caesaricides and Caesarophiles, but not in ways beneficial to Antony's interests. Thus, we are told that the Caesaricides in the Senate were astonished at the violence and the lawlessness of his behavior, but chose not to object, since this rough action had helped to ensure their safety. In contrast, not only Amatius's followers, but most Caesarophiles among the common people were outraged at what he had done. They rioted, seized the forum, burned buildings, and demanded recognition for their altar and for their popular cult of Caesar. Throughout, they cursed Antony (*Antōnion eblasphemoun*), who responded by putting their movement down in blood. For this he won the very temporary gratitude of the senatorial elite, and more lasting resentment from the Roman plebs, in whose eyes it was not Amatius, but Antony who was disgraced and degraded. In April, Antony thus managed to undo much of what he had begun in his oration, and in the following months he was forced to look more to the army—and less to the people—for support of his cause.

This example makes clear two points of broad importance. First, there are multiple audiences for any speech or action, and different groups (or fractions within a group) are capable of responding in quite different ways. Second, responses may

change over time as a group reconsiders its initial reactions, particularly as new events prompt such reconsideration. To these, we can add a third point, for it remains ever possible that at some later date a new audience will emerge and for reasons of its own will choose to take interest in an old case. This brings us back to Thersites.

THE TEARS OF A CLOWN

From the *Iliad*'s description, it is abundantly clear that Thersites was a master of corrosive discourse, and for years had been slandering the mighty, trafficking in scandals, and freely delighting in ridicule. An "outrageous word-hurler" (2.275), he shrieked reproaches at kings (2.214, 2.222, 2.224, 2.277) and subjected them to mockery (2.215, 2.256), using speech that others—his adversaries and his audience—considered a model of and a provocation to profound disorder (2.214–15). Readers of the *Iliad* encounter Thersites, however, in a place normally reserved for other sorts of speakers (also other sorts of speech), and the tension of the narrative derives from his paradoxical attempt to gain authorization for a discourse that is, by its very nature, antithetical to the construction of authority.

Consider, for instance, the characteristic relation of these two forms of discourse to the category of space. In general, authoritative discourses tend to be disseminated from places that are symbolically, and often physically, both lofty and central. As a result, attention is focused on those who speak within such a setting at the same time that the members of the group defined by this central point also are made to look up to them. This is evident not only in the examples we have considered (Assembly, Senate, and *Thing*), but also in such contemporary settings as the pulpit, the podium, or the judge's bench. In contrast, corrosive discourses seemingly come from nowhere and no one in particular, circulating, as it were, through back alleys, servants' quarters, toilets, locker rooms, and other low places. As such they can represent themselves and be regarded as nothing other than "the voice of the people." Seemingly spoken by everyone, they are also spoken by no one. As products of an invisible, anonymous collectivity, they are attached to no iden-

tifiable speakers: No one takes responsibility for them, and no one runs risks on their account.


Things are different, however, when some rash soul gives full voice to things that are more safely (and no less efficaciously) spoken in whispers and titters, or when she or he brings the speech of the gutters and lavatories into a privileged—and eminently public—place. We thus come to understand that by placing himself at the center of the assembly, instead of continuing to operate at its margins, Thersites committed a tactical blunder, relinquishing the anonymity that protects those who trade in corrosive discourse, and exposing himself to easy repression. Once visible, he becomes vulnerable, as Odysseus recognizes.

The physical and verbal beating that Odysseus administers also takes place in full public view at the center of the assembly. Vulnerable in his visibility, Thersites is also painfully visible in his vulnerability. Driven from the center, smashed to the ground, bloodied and reduced to tears, the scold becomes an object of scorn; the maker of jokes becomes the butt of others' laughter, and in its laughter, the audience pronounces judgment:

Thersites sat down, terrified
And pained, and looking about aimlessly, he wiped away his tears.
Although grieving, the others laughed sweetly at him.
And thus someone would say, looking at his neighbor:
"Truly, Odysseus has done thousands of great deeds . . .
But the greatest deed he has accomplished
Is keeping this outrageous word-hurler out of the assembly."
(*Iliad* 2.268–75)

Within the text of the *Iliad*, this stands as the final word on Thersites, and for many generations it held more or less unquestioned sway. Other audiences, however, who stand outside the text and maintain some critical stance toward its authorial designs, are capable of reaching other judgments. Each time these lines are read, other possibilities emerge, and if Thersites' tears rendered him ridiculous to the Achaeans, they have come to evoke rather more sympathy from many modern readers. Millennia later, the tears shed in pain, fear, and humiliation by this master of corrosive discourse continue to eat away at any

respect one might conceivably have for Odysseus, Agamemnon, the golden sceptre, or the symbolic and sociopolitical system that endowed them with authority. Discourses of all sorts can be very rapid or slow and gradual in gaining—or altering—their efficacy. This text, like many others, continues to speak, and as it is read or heard in novel ways by novel audiences, it has come to inflict shame on those who were once its heroes.



PRESIDENTS AND PROTESTERS

Changes in the Mode of Authority Production

STAGES AND STAGE MANAGEMENT

Although we still have a handful of sites whose authorizing capacity is not only formidable, but ancient and abiding (the Supreme Court, the Oval Office, or the papal throne of St. Peter, for example), access to these is rigidly restricted to those who hold the offices of which they are a (perhaps *the*) prime prerogative. Others who wish to speak with authority must seek access to some other, lesser site or alternatively, they can attempt to create sites, either fabricating them *de novo* or inserting them within existing institutional structures.

Examples of such attempts were clear in the two conferences we considered in the last chapter, although it is an oversimplification to treat these as the creations of a single would-be speaker. Rather, as is usually the case in such endeavors, many actors collaborated. Some gave their time and energy; some their knowledge, connections, or names and reputations; some their cash, which tends to be the most appreciated of contributions, as its liquidity makes it convertible into all of the others. One can, however, be more precise in identifying four sorts of parties—individual and institutional—that cooperated in this undertaking. The list would include (1) intellectuals, both in-

side the academy and out (the learned societies that sponsored the meetings, the Harvard group that organized them, Arendt, and most of the other speakers); (2) the State, which participated both openly and covertly (the State Department representatives who spoke or attended, and the CIA, which channeled funds to the RRC); (3) the media, both public and private (the newspaper editor who helped plan and fund the meetings, representatives of other newspapers, the USIA, and Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, Harvard University Press, which published the proceedings); and (4) capital (the foundations which supplied funding, and most of their directors). Obviously, these groups did not all participate in equal measure, nor did each one articulate with all the others, but all had some role to play, as well as some interest in the outcome.

These same sorts of groups, and others as well, collaborate in varied combinations to produce different sorts of stages for the production and dissemination of authoritative speech: Think tanks, talk shows, newspaper columns, government bureaus, university departments, specialized journals, and professional societies and their annual meetings are a few of the many possibilities. In each specific instance, a different set of collaborators is involved, and the stage's operations can be expected to advance their interests in a manner that reflects the extent of their contributions.

Stages cannot reproduce their backers' and managers' interests in unmediated fashion, however. The interests of a stage's audience (actual or potential, real or desired) must also be taken into account, and activities on the stage are designed to attract and hold its audience, while also advancing the interests of the backers. Further, there may be disagreements among the backers and managers regarding the relative value and importance of their respective contributions, and the influence to which they are entitled. Both factors are destabilizing in different ways. In the first instance, stages are always modifying themselves in reaction to the audiences and audience responses they evoke. In the second, tensions and conflicts among collaborators often lead to changes in orientation, and also to changes of personnel.

In all cases, the production of a stage with authorizing capacity is a difficult and costly task, and production of the stage is

not enough. Speakers must also be found to appear on it, and the process of their selection has its own complexities. To begin, certain kinds of credentials are conventionally sought, which involve such items as professional training, official positions, honorific titles, and institutional affiliations. In part, these help to establish speakers' qualifications and expertise, as is seen from their use in the framing devices that condition audiences' initial receptivity, such as formal introductions, certificates posted on office walls, press releases, and dust jacket blurbs. Further, the prominent display of such credentials helps constitute the stage not only as a space reserved for persons of distinction, but as a place that simultaneously derives distinction from and bestows it on those permitted to speak there.

Exclusion from this space is practiced on the basis of credentials, but the screen of credentials does not yield speakers for the stage, only the pool from which speakers are selected. A second screen, used less openly and perhaps less consciously than the first, completes the selection process. And if the screen of credentials identifies those who are qualified to speak on a given topic, the second one lifts out of this pool those who can be trusted to speak most effectively the interests of the groups and individuals who collaborate in the production and management of the stage.

To accomplish their goals, stage managers need not write speakers' lines for them, nor even coach their delivery, though at times they are tempted to do so. Least of all must they speak through their speakers in blatantly ventriloquistic fashion. Rather, they need only supply the stage and select from the pool of the qualified those who are most committed — whether sincerely or opportunistically — to saying just what the managers and backers wish to have said. Such persons they will authorize (and also pay); others, they will not. To the latter are left several alternatives: They can rest silent, revise their speeches, audition for other stages, or they can try to find backers and collaborators with whom to produce stages of their own — stages that will, of course, find themselves in competition with those from which their founders were previously excluded.

Contrasting this situation to that of antiquity, I cannot really see a loss of authority; rather, authority seems to have splintered, expanded, and multiplied. In some ways, this can be un-

derstood as a relatively straightforward consequence of demographic growth and the trend toward specialization; that is, the ongoing division of intellectual and discursive labor that lets ever more people speak with authority to ever more (but ever smaller) audiences in ever greater detail about ever more arcane topics. No doubt these are significant factors, but I do think one can take the analysis further.

SHATTERED EAGLES AND RESOURCEFUL MONKEYS

In order to illustrate these points more concretely, let me consider one last example, an incident from the spring of 1992 that the *New York Times* reported as follows (see also figure 9.1):

LAS VEGAS, NEV. APRIL 13 [1992] (AP) — Former President Ronald Reagan was jostled but was not harmed today when a man walked onto a stage where he was speaking and smashed an honorary crystal shrine, hitting him with its shards.

After smashing the statue, which had just been given to Mr. Reagan by the National Association of Broadcasters, the man tried to speak into the microphone but was grabbed by Secret




Figure 9.1 (Photo courtesy of Jim Laurie, *Las Vegas Review Journal*.)

Service agents, who threw him to the ground and then took him away.

The man in question is one Rick Paul Springer, who was most often identified in the press as a forty-one-year-old anti-nuclear activist. Over the course of his life, Mr. Springer has also worked as a carpenter, a paramedic, an able-bodied seaman, a counselor for abused children, and has spent much time backpacking through the wilderness. In 1987, standing at the Nevada Test Site, he first realized the importance of the issue to which he would devote himself thereafter, and which he believes is essential to the survival not just of humanity, but of all living creatures and the earth itself.

Since then he has committed himself to the work of organizing, raising funds, and speaking out about the danger of nuclear tests, in the belief that ending tests is the first step toward abolishing nuclear weapons altogether. The task has been difficult, and although he is convinced that most people agree with him in a general way, complacency is widespread and few share his sense of urgency. Finding effective channels through which to spread his message has also been a problem, for the antinuclear issue is hardly on the agenda of the major media. But in 1990, he had an idea.

What Springer envisioned was an event mixing music and politics in the spirit of the Woodstock and Live Aid concerts. Those attracted by the music could be educated about the issue, and the spectacle itself would be so impressive as to ensure press coverage, through which the message could be further spread. With this, he expected to constitute a breakthrough to mass awareness, after which patterns of reporting, the level of pressure on the government, and finally, policy decisions would have to change.

Rick Springer called his vision the Hundredth Monkey Project in allusion to a book by Ken Keyes, Jr. that is popular among those committed to the antinuclear cause. It tells a story that begins in 1952, when a monkey on the Pacific island of Koshima learned to wash the sweet potatoes that previously she and her fellow monkeys had eaten covered with sand. Over the next six years, according to researchers who studied these monkeys, the practice spread slowly from one monkey to another.

But in the fall of 1958, it seems that a certain critical mass was reached when roughly a hundred monkeys had learned to wash their sweet potatoes. Then, almost at once, this knowledge spread to all the other monkeys on the island, and to monkeys on other islands as well. As Keyes told the story, "The added energy of this hundredth monkey somehow created an ideological breakthrough," and he went on to draw a moral: "Your awareness is needed in saving the world from nuclear war. You may be the 'Hundredth Monkey.'"

For two years, Springer devoted his efforts (and virtually all of his personal savings) to realize his Hundredth Monkey Project. In promotional materials, he predicted that 500,000 people would attend and that "dozens of international speakers and world class musical artists" would appear. Further, he described the method he was pursuing, which he also recommended to those whose help he solicited: "To envision and believe in the event as an end to nuclear testing. To secure the involvement and support of dedicated world organizers, celebrities, inspirational leaders, indigenous peoples, world and local peace groups, and individual activists at large" (see appendix A).

Securing such support proved difficult, however. Soon he discovered that an almost unbreachable wall of agents and managers separated him from the musical artists he hoped to engage. Of the one hundred twenty performers on his original list, he managed to speak directly with no more than a handful, and only one (Ritchie Havens) agreed to appear. Established organizations, although sympathetic, would not commit themselves unless they could see that all other aspects of the project were firmly in place. Similarly, foundations were unwilling to make grants, and explained that the elements of political action in his plans could compromise their tax-exempt status. After submitting nearly a hundred applications, he received funds from only one backer: \$5,000 from the Rex Foundation, which ultimately went for Porta-potties.

Choosing a location also posed problems. Although he considered Washington, DC for the visibility it would offer and San Francisco for ease in attracting a crowd, he ultimately opted for a setting as close as possible to the Nevada Test Site, where the threat of testing could be confronted directly, and where he himself had first become committed to the cause. In-

surance proved expensive and permits impossible to obtain, even after prolonged negotiations in which he felt a new hurdle was added for every one he cleared. In spite of all the obstacles, Springer forged ahead and laid plans for a ten-day extravaganza with three distinct parts: "The Event," a concert in the Nevada desert (10–12 April 1992); "The Walk," a communal march to the test site, some fifty-five miles away (13–17 April); and finally, "The Action," a mass protest at government offices in Las Vegas timed for Earth Day (18 April).

Gradually, some pieces fell together. Speakers were lined up and bands were booked, although not the top talent he had sought. Important support came from Earth Day International, which named the Hundredth Monkey its official Project for 1992, and later from Greenpeace, which gave its endorsement just three weeks before the opening events. Finally, two thousand people gathered in the desert on Friday, 10 April: a respectable turnout, but far less than Rick Springer had hoped. "I was a great dreamer and visionary," he would later observe, "but I wasn't very realistic."

To be sure, lack of stars and lack of a crowd, if nothing else, kept the event from becoming news. There was no national coverage, and even the Las Vegas paper showed little interest. Other problems were also distressing. By monitoring government radio communications, Springer and his colleagues learned that a nuclear test was scheduled for Tuesday, 14 April, when their own plans called for them to be approaching the test site. It is difficult to gauge their emotions at this point: Excitement at what they had accomplished mingled with frustration at the ways they had fallen short, and there were varying measures of anger, disappointment, energy, and resolve. On Sunday night, a decision was made to travel the eleven miles from the concert grounds to Las Vegas on the following day, 13 April, and to stage a protest at the offices of the U.S. Department of Energy.

OTHER PEOPLE'S STAGES

Many of the group took part in this action, and twenty-six of them were arrested. Some five hundred others, according to plan, began their march to the test site. And, on the same day,

across town at the Las Vegas Hilton, the National Association of Broadcasters convened its annual meeting, with 50,000 people from the radio and television industry in attendance. Springer had been aware of this coincidence for months, and he was also aware of the opportunities it presented. Off and on, he had thought about how he might call the antinuclear issue to the attention of the NAB, a group that, in his view, "has a deathhold on the media."

Among the ideas he entertained, his favorite scenario was one in which a hundred people in monkey costumes would enter the Hilton and scamper about, waving signs and distributing leaflets. When the day came, however, he had neither a hundred people nor the money for monkey suits. And so, he made his way to the Hilton alone, holding press credentials (obtained by a friend) that would admit him to the meeting's prime event, and he pondered just what he would do.

Arriving at the Hilton's banquet room, he found a group of three thousand top media executives listening as Eddie Fritts, president of the NAB, concluded his remarks and presented the crystal eagle and the Association's Distinguished Service Award to Mr. Reagan for his "contributions to broadcasting and the American public." Then, to warm applause, the Great Communicator himself moved to the podium. His address, included in full as appendix B, was a rambling affair, in which jokes ("It's a pleasure to be in Las Vegas, the city that never sleeps . . . I used to work in a city that never wakes up"), flattery ("Radio and television waves are the Paul Reveres of the universe . . . Before radio, most of the world was not free"), and autobiographical reminiscences ("In Hollywood if you did not sing or dance you became an after-dinner speaker. Pretty soon I did more speaking than acting and found myself running for Governor . . .") laid the ground for predictable observations on themes dear to the ex-President, his constituency, and his immediate audience: the evils of Communism and drugs, and the ways in which the Bible, the family, radio, television, and the movies can help combat them.

Meanwhile, off to the side, Rick Springer wrestled with his conscience, prayed quietly, and worked up his courage. Finally, at what seemed to him an appropriate moment, he strode forward, slowly and resolutely. Given his dress, manner, and gen-

eral appearance, most people took him for a sound technician until he picked up the two-foot high crystal eagle, raised it over his head, and — in what he later described as “the clearest, most meditative moment of my life” — smashed it to bits. Then he advanced to the podium, displaced Reagan from the microphone, and spoke four words — “Excuse me, Mr. President” — before the Secret Service laid him out.

As he was dragged away, Springer was heard to shout: “Help, there’s a nuclear bomb test tomorrow,” and he later explained that he wished not only to publicize his cause, but to warn the broadcasters and through them the world of a pressing danger, for he views each test as nothing less than “bombing the water supply of future generations.” Backstage, he was handcuffed and placed under arrest, then taken to a Las Vegas jail, where he was charged with state and federal offenses. After a minute or two, President Reagan returned and finished his speech, quipping to an appreciative crowd, “Is he a Democrat, by chance?”

So strongly does this incident resemble that of Thersites, with which we began our inquiry, it seems excessive to belabor the point. Still, it is worth specifying the areas of closest resemblance.

- Both involve an authorized and an unauthorized speaker.
- The speech of the authorized speaker, while foolish, is given a respectful, even an enthusiastic hearing.
- Conflict erupts when the unauthorized speaker enters the authorized and authorizing place.
- He does so to challenge policies associated with the authorized speaker, which, in his view, create terrible dangers that must be avoided.
- Within this arena, no one responds to the content of his speech; rather, they challenge his right to speak there.
- Before he can finish, he is violently removed.
- After this brief period of turbulence, control of the authorized and authorizing sphere reverts to the authorized speakers, and the audience on hand signals its approval.
- The possibility remains open, however, that other audi-

ences, hearing the story at second hand, may reach other conclusions.

I do not mean to underestimate the strength or importance of these similarities: Indeed, I was led to study the Las Vegas episode precisely because of them, and because they suggested to me that authority in contemporary society operates much as it did in the ancient world. Still, there is a danger in overemphasizing them, and mistaking part of a story for the whole. For however similar these incidents may be, both should be situated within longer histories, and we need to recall that Springer, like Thersites, was involved in other actions before and after these moments of highest drama.

If we shift our attention and focus on earlier phases of their activity, it rapidly becomes evident how much Thersites and Rick Springer differ from one another and, what is more, how much their differences reflect and result from other differences between their respective eras. We have seen how Springer, in all his work on the Hundredth Monkey Project, worked to orchestrate a collaboration between activists and entertainers, hoping to produce a new stage from which to authorize the speech of people he would select to advance his views. Such an option was hardly available to Thersites. Homeric society, as we have seen, had very few authorized and authorizing places, nor did it allow for the possibility of others being created, least of all through human agency. Given their normal exclusion from Assembly, those who fell outside the sceptre-bearing elite had little hope of speaking with authority. In such circumstances, one of the few bold strategies available to them is that adopted by Thersites: to master the corrosive discourses of blame and ridicule and use them to speak not with, but *against* authority.

STRUGGLES BETWEEN ACTORS AND STRUGGLES BETWEEN STAGES

Later phases of Rick Springer’s activity also differ markedly from the corresponding period in the life of Thersites. Our last glimpse of the latter shows him barred from assembly, tearfully accepting the silence to which he has been condemned by Odysseus, the Achaean soldiers, and the Homeric text.

Springer, however, has managed to find other options, not necessarily because he is more clever, determined, or the like, nor because his cause is more just, but precisely because his society maintains a multitude of stages, with some degree of competition among them. Exclusions from one need not be the last word; indeed, exclusion from one stage can prompt invitations from others.

In a subsequent series of interviews, articles, and court appearances, Rick Springer has continued to speak out, and he has had opportunities, not only to speak, but to speak in privileged settings. Among the most interesting of these was his appearance on "CBS This Morning," Friday, 17 April, four days after his encounter with Mr. Reagan (see appendix C for a transcript).

This show, which is seen in two and a half million households daily, offers a mix of news, opinion, features, entertainment, and pleasant chit-chat among its regular hosts. Guests are presented for a number of reasons, and in styles that cue the audience on how each one is to be regarded. When it wishes to authorize their speech, the show is fully capable of doing so. Particularly important are formal introductions and the level of deference or courtesy shown by hosts. Consider, for instance, the way in which the day's lead guests were characterized in the first seconds of this broadcast.

HARRY SMITH (co-host): Good morning. It is Friday. April 17th. I'm Harry Smith.

PAULA ZAHN (co-host): Good morning, everybody. I'm Paula Zahn. Welcome to "CBS This Morning."

SMITH: Making headlines this morning, the FDA has new rules for breast implants. We're going to talk with Commissioner David Kessler for a minute.

ZAHN: And you'll meet the protester who crashed in on Ronald Reagan this week.

When Dr. Kessler was brought on as the show's first guest, his professional title and official position were emphasized, and Paula Zahn gave him a warm welcome. Springer was treated somewhat differently.

HARRY SMITH: Anti-nuclear activist Rick Springer says he never had any intention of hurting former President Reagan earlier this week. Springer says he just wanted to make a point. Still, the incident startled Mr. Reagan and jolted the Secret Service. Springer is with a group called The 100th Monkey, which opposes all nuclear testing. And he joins us this morning from KLAS-TV in Las Vegas. Good morning.

In these introductory remarks, Harry Smith gave basic information, while also signaling caution in three different ways: (1) his repeated use of the phrase "Springer says" to preface his guest's characterizations of the incident; (2) his adversative juxtaposition of these to the reactions of more responsible observers ("Still, the incident startled Mr. Reagan and jolted the Secret Service"); and (3) his subtle suggestion that Springer's views lie outside the accepted mainstream (as one who "opposes *all* nuclear testing"). The "protester" and "activist" would be given an opportunity to speak, but the host, the show, and the network were careful not to offer anything that could be construed as an endorsement of him, his actions, or what he would have to say.

Smith's first question was reasonably open-ended: "What were you trying to accomplish earlier this week?" Seizing the opportunity, Springer began to explain how he hoped to use the NAB convention to alert the country to the realities of nuclear testing. At this, Smith rapidly changed tack, and began to treat Springer himself as the story: a curiosity or "human interest" item. His next eleven questions focused narrowly on events at the Hilton, as he tried to steer conversation away from the issue of nuclear testing.

"What was smashed when you went up onto the stage next to the former president?"

"Did you smash that intentionally?"

"What exactly happened when you got on the stage up there?"

"Did you give any consideration to what might happen to you when you went on that stage?"

"The question everybody has is how did you get so close?"

"Did you have any IDs?"

"Did you have any of the requisite, sort of, media passes?"

"What have you been charged with?"

"Are you surprised at all that they let you go?"

"What's the possibility that you will go to jail?"

"How long might you have to serve?"

In his answers, Springer struggled to introduce wherever possible items that he thought important: the bomb test at the Nevada Test Site, France's decision to discontinue its testing program, his lifetime commitment to nonviolence. Moving to wrap things up, Smith offered one last question, which was, in effect, a call to repent and show remorse.

HARRY SMITH: Do you have any regrets about what you did this week?

RICK SPRINGER: Well, I certainly must offer an apology to Mr. Reagan. I am very sorry that the Secret Service jostled him in an effort to get me off the stage. I have no regrets as to the fact that I approached the — the podium, and I think that the coverage that I have received due to this act, is an excellent example of what it takes to wake up and startle the media and, indeed, the American public, whose apathy is responsible for the continuation of nuclear testing to this day.

HARRY SMITH: Mm. Rick Springer, we thank you for joining us. Do appreciate it. Twenty two after.

When Springer's image vanished from the screen, others joined the conversation, offering their judgments, and cueing their audience on how to regard him.

PAULA ZAHN: Good morning.

HARRY SMITH: Wasn't that interesting?

PAULA ZAHN: I loved that segment.

HARRY SMITH: Springer.

MARK MCEWEN (meteorologist): He could talk. Most of the time you get people like Squeaky Fromme — you remember?

HARRY SMITH: Well, as it turns — this guy is a well-known — I don't know about well-known, but there is lots of tape of him leading nuclear — anti-nuclear demonstrations and stuff. I mean,

that's really what this guy is all about. That's — because he was released so quickly and everybody said, "What? Excuse me."

MARK MCEWEN: Yeah.

HARRY SMITH: And he has a — he has a real track record of — of pacifism, so . . .

MARK MCEWEN: I thought that was great. Do you think you're going to go to jail? "No, I think they're going to drop the charges," which I thought — I don't know if I would have said that. I'd say, "Oh, please — oh, please — oh, please."

PAULA ZAHN: But he did apologize for hitting the former president with the shards of glass.

MARK MCEWEN: Absolutely.

HARRY SMITH: It's just amazing — just amazing . . .

Apparently, Rick Springer surprised his hosts and threw them off their script, as can be seen from the mangled syntax with which they offered their reactions. In effect, after initially holding him at arm's length, the authorized spokespersons of this widely-viewed show bestowed their (partial and guarded) approval on him, taking particular note of his courage, his commitment, and his powers of articulation. And this, in turn, prompted reaction from other quarters.

Four days later, on 21 April, the *Wall Street Journal* ran a particularly aggressive editorial (appendix D) that began by lamenting, "It was predictable, but a bit startling nonetheless, to find Richard Paul Springer staring out at us from our TV sets." It went on to depict him in lurid prose as "the latest entry to a special galaxy of media-produced stars — people whose aberrations, disturbances and general aggressions against society have won them fame as 'political activists,'" and to place him among the ranks of "political fanatics prepared to wreak whatever havoc necessary to advance their notions of humanity."

So hysterical is the rhetoric, and so obvious the financial interests being defended, one is tempted to think the *Journal* felt threatened by Rick Springer, and viewed the spectre of him on network TV much as Odysseus viewed Thersites in the center of the Homeric assembly: So wrong a person in so right a place

as to be cause for major alarm. Such a comparison, however, here turns misleading, for Odysseus voiced no criticism of the assembly, and the *Journal* hardly views "CBS This Morning" as a (let along *the*) "right place." Witness the editorial's closing swipe.

Since Mr. Springer used phony press credentials, the Secret Service is planning to look harder at security arrangements and, especially, at press credentials. This prospect incited alarmed responses from the usual quarters that the Secret Service might now jeopardize First Amendment rights.

This isn't news, since there is hardly anything that happens, nowadays, that isn't seen as a threat to the First Amendment. What *would* be news would be if the producers of a show such as "CBS This Morning" decided that giving a character like Richard Springer a place in the media spotlight wasn't smart or healthy or in the public interest. That wouldn't simply be news, of course. That would be a miracle.

Beyond any conflict of individuals or debate on issues of policy, plainly evident here is a conflict between stages that goes well beyond the familiar rivalry of print and electronic media. Both possess some authorizing capacity, but insofar as their backers, interests, and audiences diverge, so too do the specific principles of selectivity on which they operate. Most often, these stages tolerate or ignore one another, but occasionally their differences lead to open conflict, as here, where the *Wall Street Journal*, an elite organ of and for capital, chastises "CBS This Morning," a mildly populist middlebrow show, for what it takes to be a characteristically promiscuous and irresponsible act of authorization. The point of the struggle is not just whose speech gets authorized, but more importantly, who does the authorizing and how. In its bitching about "media-created stars," one can hear the *Journal*'s displeasure with stars created by other media, and authorized speakers who speak others' interests.

One could pursue the details of this case almost indefinitely. Among issues worth pursuing further: (1) Did the *Journal* genuinely feel threatened by Springer, or did it seize on him as a club with which to beat CBS? (2) For whose eyes was the editorial written? Was its intent to wean an audience away from tele-

vision, to diminish TV's authorizing capacity, to shame TV producers into better behavior, to intimidate them into sticking closer to standards the *Journal* regarded as normative (i.e., hegemonic), or something else again? (3) Why was the editorial written in a language of scorn and ridicule? Ought it be considered an instance of corrosive discourse? (4) What were the reactions to the editorial within CBS? Were there any communications between CBS executives and those at the *Journal*? Was there any public response?

The time has come, however, to return to the broader issue of whether authority in the modern world differs markedly from its ancient counterpart, an issue on which I remain frankly ambivalent. On the one hand, the materials I have considered above convince me that authority itself remains very much what it always has been: an effect characteristic of strongly asymmetric relations between speaker and audience, predisposing the latter to defer to the discourse of the former in ways that are often quite uncritical. This notwithstanding, I have come to believe that within recent history there has emerged nothing less than a new mode of authority production, the central operation of which is no longer the production of speech, nor its authorization, but rather the production of stages with authorizing capacity.

In this, we have moved from a situation of scarcity to one of abundance. Ancient Greece, Rome, and Scandinavia—to cite the examples considered in earlier chapters—had relatively few authorized and authorizing places. Consequently, each such site commanded the attention and respect of large audiences, sometimes approximating the total population, over very long periods of time. Given their obvious value, control over these sites was tightly managed, usually by an aristocratic oligarchy. Access was severely limited, and competition might be fierce, for the chief problem facing those outside the oligarchy who wished to produce an act of authoritative speech (e.g., Thersites, Cotta, Egil's witnesses) was gaining entry to these few, but extremely potent workshops of authority production.

In contrast, we now have a large and ever increasing number of stages that are organized by entrepreneurial consortiums as instruments or factories for the mass production (and ongoing reproduction) of the authority effect. With this expansion

comes specialization, subdivision of markets, and competition among stages, as the controlling interests of each stage (financial, ideological, and aesthetic) not only give shape and direction to its activities, but place it in rivalry with other stages that embody and advance other interests. Success or failure in this competition — which may involve open polemic, more discreet struggles for speakers, audiences, financial backing, favorable reviews, or all the above — produces a different, and possibly volatile, history for each stage. Some stages rise and others fall, some adapt in order to survive, and whenever one rings down its final curtain, there are others waiting to take its place.

NOTES

EPIGRAPHS

"All authority": Carl J. Friedrich, "Loyalty and Authority," *Confluence* 3 (1954), p. 312.

"It is the access": Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 109.

CHAPTER ONE

Buyers, Sellers, and Authorities

Works in political philosophy: See, inter alia, David V. J. Bell, *Power, Influence, and Authority: An Essay in Political Linguistics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); R. Blaine Harris, ed., *Authority: A Philosophical Analysis* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1976); Richard E. Flathman, *The Practice of Political Authority: Authority and the Authoritative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); E. D. Watt, *Authority* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Richard T. DeGeorge, *The Nature and Limits of Authority* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985); J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Authority Revisited* (New York: New York University Press, 1987); and Joseph Raz, ed., *Authority* (New York: New York University Press, 1990). DeGeorge, Harris, and Watt all have extensive bibliographies. An earlier collection in the same vein is Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Authority* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

Works in social psychology: The most important are: T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of 'The Authoritarian Personality'* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954); Milton Rokeach et al., *The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1960); and Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Rather anomalous is the approach of Richard Sennett, *Authority* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980).

Works in sociology: For Weber's position, see G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds., *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 212-300 and 941-54. Among those who take this as their point of departure are Jeremiah F. Wolpert, "Toward a Sociology of Authority," in *Studies in Leadership*, ed. Alvin W. Gouldner (New York: Russell, 1965), pp. 679-702; Robert A. Nisbet, *Tradition and Revolt: Historical and Sociological Essays* (New York: Random House, 1968); *Idem*, *The Twilight of Authority* (London: Heinemann, 1976); Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); *Idem*, *The Constitution of Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Talcott Parsons, *Politics and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

Recent works: See, in particular, Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); *Idem*, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972); *Idem*, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and his World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); *Idem*, "From Notes Made in 1970-71," in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 132-58; Maurice Bloch, *Ritual, History and Power: Selected Papers in Anthropology* (London: Athlone Press, 1989); *Idem*, ed., *Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Society* (New York: Academic Press, 1975); James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); *Idem*, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). More specialized, but extremely helpful works include Andrew Apter, *Black Critics and Kings: The Hermeneutics of Power in Yoruba Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Lamont Lindstrom, *Knowledge and Power in a South Pacific Society* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990); Joel Kuipers,

Power in Performance: The Creation of Textual Authority in Weyewa Ritual Speech (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990); Sophia Menache, *Vox Dei: Communication in the Middle Ages* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Donald Brenneis and Fred Myers, eds., *Dangerous Words: Language and Politics in the Pacific* (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1991); Richard Terdiman, *Discourse/Counter-Discourse: The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth Century France* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Marcel Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la grèce archaïque*, 3d ed. (Paris: François Maspero, 1979).

Latin *auctoritas*: The classic discussion remains R. Heinze, "Auctoritas," *Hermes* 60 (1925): 348-66. See also, more recently, K. Lütke, 'Auctoritas' bei Augustin, mit einer Einleitung zur römischen Vorgeschichte des Begriffs (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1968), pp. 13-46. For a full listing of the term's occurrence within legal contexts, see the Savigny Institute's *Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae*, Vol. 1 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1903), pp. 513-17.

Greater than influence, less than command: In Rome, a distinction was made between *auctoritas* and *imperium*. Only high-ranking magistrates and military commanders could speak with *imperium* while acting within their official capacities, and when they did so their words were legally binding. The speech of those entitled to speak with *auctoritas* but not *imperium* (e.g., senators or priests) was not enforceable in the same way, but exerted considerable moral pressure on the hearer.

Auctoritas venditoris and *mancipatio*: For the earliest attestations, see P. R. Coleman-Norton, trans., *The Twelve Tables* (Princeton: Princeton University Dept. of Classics, 1950), pp. 11 and 13 (§5.2 and 6.3-4, respectively). For some of the more recent discussions, see Alan Watson, *Rome of the XII Tables* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 134-56; Hans Julius Wolff, "Ein Vorschlag zum Verständnis des Manzipationsrituals," in Fritz Baur et al., eds., *Beiträge zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte und zum geltenden Zivilrecht: Festgabe für Johannes Sontis* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1977), pp. 1-9; O. Behrends, "La mancipatio nelle XII Tavole," *Iura* 33 (1982): 46-103; J. G. Wolf, "Die Mancipatio: Roms älteste Rechtsgeschäft," in *Jahrbuch der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaft* (1984); M. Lemosse, "La mise en cause judiciaire de l'auctor," *Laesio* 30 (1984): 163-70; Max Kaser, "Alt-römisches Eigentum und 'usucapio,'" *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 105 (1988): 122-64; and André Magdelain, "Auctoritas rerum," in *Jus Imperium Auctoritas: Études de droit romain* (Rome: École française de Rome, 1990), pp. 685-705. Beyond this, there is a large literature dating back to the 1930s.

Authority and Authorities

Executive and epistemic authority, "in authority" and "an authority": Particularly insightful on this point is R. B. Friedman, "On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy," in *Authority*, pp. 56-91. Regarding the kinds of authority based upon and operative through claims to specialized knowledge, see Thomas Haskell, ed., *The Authority of Experts: Studies in History and Theory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984) and Stanley Aronowitz, *Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). Epistemic and executive authority are not necessarily opposed to one another, but can be complementary. Often the two articulate in hierarchic fashion, such that epistemic authority supplies advice, expertise, and the like to executive authority, while the latter retains final decision-making power.

Command and obedience: For Weber, authority is *Herrschaft* ("domination") that has been legitimized, and results in the ability to issue commands that will be obeyed. I am inclined to think that such a model impoverishes our understanding of authority, and privileges the position of military officers and factory bosses, while obscuring the equally real (if less blunt) authority of others who do not deal in commands: poets, philosophers, scientists, etc. Weber seems to have toyed with a broader notion of authority and domination, but tossed it aside in the following passage: "A position ordinarily designated as 'dominating' can emerge from the social relations in a drawing room as well as in the market, from the rostrum of a lecture-hall as well as from the command post of a regiment, from an erotic or charitable relationship as well as from scholarly discussion or athletics. Such a broad definition would, however, render the term 'domination' scientifically useless" (*Economy and Society*, pp. 942-43).

Between Coercion and Persuasion

Persuasion and coercion: The discussion of Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 92-93, is most helpful on this point.

Anarchist critiques: See, for example, the essays on "Authority and Anarchism" that appeared in J. Roland Pennock and John Chapman, eds., *Anarchism* (New York: New York University Press, 1978), or Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

"Capacity for reasoned elaboration": See Carl J. Friedrich, "Power and Authority," in *An Introduction to Political Theory* (New York:

Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 121-32; Idem, *Tradition and Authority* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

Authorized and Authorizing Objects, Times, and Places

Uniforms and insignia: Alongside Charles Merriam's old idea of *miranda* ("things to be admired") and *credenda* ("things to be believed") as the instruments through which authority is constructed and maintained (*Political Power* [New York: McGraw Hill, 1934], pp. 102-32), one should note Stanley J. Tambiah's attention to "*palladia* and *regalia*, which are enduring sedimentations and objectifications of power and virtue, the possession of which is a guarantee of legitimacy" (*The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of the Amulets* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984], p. 241 [slightly altered]); Clifford Geertz, "Centers, kings, and charisma: Reflections on the symbolics of power," in *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 121-46 is also useful. Recent studies of such items are many and varied, although Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) remains fundamental. See, inter alia: Rudolf H. Wackernagel, *Die französische Kronungswagen von 1696-1825: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des repräsentativen Zeremonienwagen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966); Ole Wanscher, *Sella Curulis: The Folding Stool, An Ancient Symbol of Dignity* (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde & Bagger, 1980); Joseph Cornet, *Art royal kuba* (Milan: Edizioni Sipiel, 1982); Martin Metzger, *Königsthron und Gottesthron: Thronformen und Throndarstellungen in Ägypten und im vorderen Orient in Zweiten und Dritten Jahrtausend vor Christus* (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1985); Nathan Joseph, *Uniforms and Nonuniforms: Communication through Clothing* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Ilse Hayden, *Symbol and Privilege: The Ritual Context of British Royalty* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987); Claes Arvidsson and Erik Blomquist, *Symbols of Power: The Esthetics of Political Legitimation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksells, 1987); Valery M. Garrett, *Mandarin Squares: Mandarins and their Insignia* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990); Asa Boholm, *The Doge of Venice: The Symbolism of State Power in the Renaissance* (Gothenburg: Institute for Advanced Studies in Anthropology, 1990); and Reinhart Staats, *Die Reichskrone: Geschichte und Bedeutung eines europäischen Symbols* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprechts, 1991). Most broadly on the significance and efficacy of fetishized objects, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984) and Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

Rituals of coronation: Numerous detailed studies are available. See, inter alia: Richard Jackson, *Vive le roi! A History of the French Coronation from Charles V to Charles X* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Sean Wilentz, ed., *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual and Politics since the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985); David Cannadine and Simon Price, eds., *Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Janos M. Bok, ed., *Coronations: Medieval and Early Modern Monarchic Ritual* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

Defrocking: I have been unable to find any serious analyses of the procedures of ritual defrocking. Examples of annual ceremonies in which rulers are stripped of their insignia and then subjected to abuse and humiliation in order to dramatize the fact that their authority derives from their office and not their person are well-known, however, and offer some important similarities. See, for example, the Swazi Ncwala ritual as described by Hilda Kuper, *An African Aristocracy: Rank among the Swazi* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 197-225, or the texts describing the fifth day of the Babylonian Akitu festival, which are available in James Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, 3d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 334. For a challenging alternative interpretation of the latter, see Jonathan Z. Smith, *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 90-96.

The emperor's new clothes: See Norbert Elias, *The Court Society* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 86 for an amusing and instructive historic episode in which the authority of the naked Marie Antoinette was temporarily eclipsed by the high symbolic value members of her court accorded to her royal garments.

Authorized Speech and Significant Silence

The silence of the audience: I am grateful to Pier Giorgio Solinas for having first suggested this line of inquiry to me in a branch office of the Monte dei Paschi di Siena, where he observed that one habitually and almost automatically drops one's voice upon entering only a very few sorts of establishment: churches, banks, and museums, where one feels oneself to be in the presence of the traditionally sacred or that of its modern correlatives, art and money. On silence as a signifying practice, see Bernard Dauenhauer, *Silence: The Phenomenon and its Ontological Significance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), Deborah Tannen and Muriel Saville-Troike, eds., *Perspectives on Silence* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1985), and Maria Grazia Ciani, ed., *The Regions of Silence* (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1987).

Conjunctions and Disruptions

Textual authority: The one point I would make begins with the observation that whereas speech acts exist in the moment, texts endure over time. As a result, it is not sufficient to *establish* the authority of a text, one must also insure the text's transmission and the reproduction of its authority over successive generations. Such tasks are best accomplished by large, powerful, and enduring institutions: states, churches, schools, and the like. For treatment of the differences and relations between discursive and textual authority, with specific reference to those texts most properly called canonic, see F. F. Bruce and E. G. Rupp, eds., *Holy Book and Holy Tradition* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968); Frederick Denny and Roderick Taylor, eds., *The Holy Book in Comparative Perspective* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1985); Miriam Levering, ed., *Rethinking Scripture: Essays from a Comparative Perspective* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987); and William A. Graham, *Beyond the Written Word: Oral Aspects of Scripture in the History of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). More broadly, see Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Robert von Hallberg, ed., *Canons* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" in Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 101-20; Richard Ohmann, *Politics of Letters* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1987); and Walter Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (New York: Methuen, 1982).

Authority at second hand: I do not mean that, like Kierkegaard's "disciple at second hand," I believe these accounts because they are transmitted to me by others who believed them and whom I believe. Rather, I believe they gave a sufficiently accurate picture of their society to be found credible by their primary audience, regardless of whether I believe them or whether from some unobtainably objective vantage point they "ought" to be believed.

CHAPTER FIVE

Challenges to Authority and Violent Ripostes

Subtle processes of intimidation: This point is already present in Alexis de Toqueville, *Democracy in America*, and has been developed with considerable power and sophistication within feminist theory. See also such varied discussions as Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Robin Lakoff, *Language and Women's Place* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1975); Basil Bernstein, *Class, Codes, and Control* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971); Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).

The "speech" of the slain and disappeared: Compare the discussion of Allen Feldman, *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Page Dubois, *Torture and Truth* (New York: Routledge, 1991); Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jacobo Timmerman, *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number* (New York: Knopf, 1981).

Attack and Counterattack: Authority and its Corrosion

Their actions differed significantly: Note also that in two of the cases we have studied, a well-established elite — the Homeric kings and the Roman Senate — reacted violently against those who threatened their power (Thersites on the one hand, Caesar on the other, albeit in a very different fashion). In the third instance we are dealing with a situation in which a new group — the royal line founded by Harald Fairhair and now headed by Eirik Bloodaxe — had recently taken power by force and was in the process of consolidating its power in institutional forms. In this attempt, they faced threats from members of the fading elite (leaders of noble families, like Egil) who could make use of their access to traditional sites of authority to contest the emergent royal rule. In such moments as Egil's lawsuit, religion and tradition were mobilized against the king's power, with the result that power set out to destroy them. Thersites' initiative thus has something potentially revolutionary about it, Caesar's looks more like a coup d'état, and Egil's is an act of resistance.

"A certain fatal despair": This phrase is quoted in Cicero *Ad Famil-iaris* 12.2.3, a letter written in September of 44 B.C.

Corrosive discourses: There is no systematic study that covers the myriad phenomena that one could group within this category, but one might begin with Mikhail Bakhtin's classic, *Rabelais and his World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); Robert M. Adams, *Bad Mouth: Fugitive Papers on the Dark Side* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977); and Jorg Bergmann, *Klatsch: Zur Sozialform der diskreten Indiskretion* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), the last of which contains an extremely thorough bibliography. For a variety of more specialized studies, see Karen Brison, *Just Talk: Gossip, Meetings, and Power in a Papua New Guinea Village* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992); Lindsay Watson, *Aræ: The Curse Poetry of Antiquity* (Leeds, England: Cairns, 1991); Jean-Noel Kapferer, *Rumors: Uses, Interpretations, and Images* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990); Bob Black and Adam Parfrey, eds., *Rants and Incendiary Tracts: Voices of Desperate Illumination, 1558 to Present* (New York: Amok Press, 1989); Geert van Gelder, *The Bad and the Ugly: Attitudes toward Invective Poetry in Classical Arabic Literature* (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1989); David Gilmore, *Aggression and Community: Paradoxes of Andalusian Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Patricia Meyer Spacks, *Gossip* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Michael Herzfeld, *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Jeanne Favret-Saada, *Deadly Words: Witchcraft in the Bocage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); John Haviland, *Gossip, Reputation, and Knowledge in Zinacantan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Mary Douglas, "Jokes," in *Implicit Meanings* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 90-114; P. A. Lienhardt, "The Interpretation of Rumour," in *Studies in Social Anthropology: Essays in Memory of E. E. Evans-Pritchard*, ed. J. H. M. Beattie & R. G. Lienhardt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 105-31; Frederick G. Bailey, ed., *Gifts and Poison: The Politics of Reputation* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971); *Chaos* 16 (1991), special issue on blasphemy.

Not to Praise, but to Bury

Emancipatory potential: Given the early association of *auctoritas* with the ritual of mancipation, it is tempting — if overly simplistic — to suggest that corrosive discourses stand in relation to authority much as the process of emancipation relates to mancipation. Thus, if the speech of *auctoritas venditoris* has as its essence the capacity to establish proprietary control over goods and people (who are thereby defined and treated as slaves), the essence of corrosive speech is its capacity to discredit such claims, as well as those who make and profit from them, and to liberate those who had fallen under their sway.

After Caesar's assassination: The actions of the conspirators and others in the period of complex maneuvering between the assassination and the funeral are described in Appian *Civil Wars* 2.118–43; Dio Cassius 44.20.1–35.3; Plutarch *Caesar* 67, *Antony* 14.1–2; *Brutus* 18.1–20.2; Nicolaus of Damascus 26a–27. For discussion, see Pio Grattarola, *I cesariani dalle idi di marzo alla costituzione del secondo triumvirato* (Turin: Tirrenia, 1990); Ursula Ortmann, *Cicero, Brutus, und Octavian: Republikaner und Caesarianer. Ihr gegenseitiges Verhältnis im Krisenjahr 44/43 v. Chr.* (Bonn: Habelt, 1988); Erik Wistrand, *The Policy of Brutus the Tyrannicide* (Göteborg, Sweden: Kunglige Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhället, 1981); Helga Botermann, *Die Soldaten und die römische Politik in der Zeit von Caesars Tod bis zur Begründung des zweiten Triumvirats* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1968); and D. W. Knight, "The Political Acumen of Cicero after the Death of Caesar," *Latomus* 27 (1968), pp. 157–64.

Brutus's and Cinna's speeches in the forum: The passage quoted is Plutarch *Brutus* 18.4–6. Cf. Appian *Civil War* 2.121–23.

The funeral and the oration: Descriptions are given by Appian *Civil Wars* 2.143–47; Dio Cassius 44.35.4–49.4; Suetonius *The Deified Julius* 84; Plutarch *Caesar* 68.1, *Cicero* 42.3, *Brutus* 20.3, *Antony* 14.3–4; Cicero *Philippic* 2.90–91, *Letter to Atticus* 14.10.1. Partial accounts are also found in Nicolaus of Damascus 17 and Quintilian 6.1.3.1. It is generally accepted that Appian drew much of his information on the funeral from C. Asinius Pollio's now lost history of the civil wars, a source that seems to have treated Antony in considerably more sympathetic fashion than did most later works, which were influenced by the propaganda of Octavian (later Augustus), Antony's final and most bitter rival. On the evaluation and interpretation of these sources, see Weinstock, *Divus Julius*, pp. 346–63; Andreas Alföldi, *Studien über Caesars Monarchie* (Lund, Sweden: Lund University, 1955), pp. 63–65; Emilio Gabba, *Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1956), pp. 119–51; Wilhelm Kierdorf, *Laudatio Funebris: Interpretationen und Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der römischen Leichenrede* (Meisenheim am Glan, Germany: Anton Hain, 1980), pp. 150–54; G. Kennedy, "Antony's Speech at Caesar's Funeral," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 54 (1968), pp. 99–106. Alternatively, Monroe E. Deutsch, "Antony's Funeral Speech," *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 9 (1928), pp. 127–48 has argued for the greater reliability of Suetonius's account.

Irony and subverbal cues: In Shakespeare's version of Antony's address, a similar tension exists between the denotative value of certain words and the attitude of the speaker toward these words and toward

those with whom they are associated. Inevitably, this finds expression in the precise intonation and gestures with which these lines are delivered: "For Brutus is an honorable man, / So are they all, all honorable men" (*Julius Caesar*, act III, scene ii).

Displaying the toga: The text quoted is Appian *Civil Wars* 2.146. Cf. *ibid.* 2.147; Dio Cassius 44.35.4; Suetonius *The Deified Julius* 84; Plutarch *Antony* 14.4, *Brutus* 20.3, *Caesar* 58.1.

Contemporary judgments of the oration: The sources quoted are Dio Cassius 45.35.4 and Cicero *Philippic* 2.90–91. The most important guides to normal practice in eulogies are Cicero *De Oratore* 2.45–46, 3.41–48; and Polybius 6.53–54. While the latter text admits the possibility of arousing sympathy (*sympatheia* 6.53.3), appeals to pity (Greek *oiktos* or *pathos*, Latin *miseratio*) are not condoned, nor is anything even vaguely related to anger (Greek *orgē* or *deinōsis*). Most fully, see the discussion of Kierdorf, *Laudatio Funebris*; for a convenient summary of funeral practices, J. M. C. Toynbee, *Death and Burial in the Roman World* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1971), pp. 43–50.

Fire, Sword, and Invective

Antony's intentions for the body: Suetonius *The Deified Julius* 84. Burial in the Field of Mars was itself a signal honor, previously accorded only to the ancient kings, Sulla, and Julia, the wife of Marius, whom Caesar himself had buried there, thus establishing a new and highly distinguished location for the tomb of the Julian *gens*.


Caesar's cremation and the assault on the conspirators' homes: These events are described in Suetonius *The Deified Julius* 84–85; Appian 2.147–48; Dio Cassius 44.50.2–4; Plutarch *Antony* 14.4, *Brutus* 20.4, *Caesar* 58.1; Livy *Periochae* 116. In order to avoid the dangers of a funeral (which the shrewdest among them clearly foresaw), the conspirators originally intended to fling Caesar's body into the Tiber (Suetonius *The Deified Julius* 82.4; Dio Cassius 44.35.1; cf. Appian *Civil Wars* 2.135; Cicero *Letter to Atticus* 14.10.1). On the crowd's action and its importance, see B. Liou-Gille, "Funérailles in urbe et divinisation, les funérailles de César," in *Res Sacrae: Hommages à Henri Le Bonniec*, eds. D. Porte and J.-P. Néraudan (Brussels: Latomus, 1988), pp. 288–93; Alföldi, *Studien über Caesars Monarchie*, pp. 53–82, esp. pp. 65–70; Z. Yavetz, *Plebs and Princes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 63–70; and Guy Achard, "«Ratio Popularis» et funérailles," *Études classiques* 93 (1975), pp. 166–78, esp. pp. 173–75.

The fate of Helvius Cinna: Valerius Maximus 9.9.1; Suetonius *The Deified Julius* 85; Dio Cassius 44.50.4; Appian *Civil Wars* 2.147; Plutarch *Caesar* 58.2–3, *Brutus* 20.5–6; Valerius Maximus 9.9.1.

Amatius (pseudo-Marius) and the altar to Caesar: These events are described in Appian *Civil Wars* 3.2–3, 16, and 36; Dio Cassius 44.51.1, Suetonius *The Deified Julius* 85; Livy *Periochae* 116. On the significance of these events (with some disagreement as to their details), see Weinstock, *Divus Julius*, pp. 364–67; Alföldi, *Studien über Caesars Monarchie*, pp. 70–76; Yavetz, *Plebs and Princeps*, pp. 58–62, 70–74; Helga Gesche, *Die Vergottung Caesars* (Frankfurt: Michael Lassleben Kallmünz, 1968), pp. 64–67; M. Montagna Pasquinucci, “L’‘altare’ del tempio del divo Giulio,” *Athenaeum* 62 (1974), pp. 144–55; and Cornelia Cogrossi, “Pietà popolare e divinizzazione nel culto di Cesare del 44 a.C.,” *Contributi dell’Istituto di Storia Antica* 7 (1981), pp. 141–60.

Caesar’s cousin: Most have rejected Amatius’s claims to descend from Marius, but the opposite view has been forcefully argued by F. J. Meijer, “Marius’ Grandson,” *Mnemosyne* 39 (1986), pp. 112–21. If the claims are taken as valid, one could understand why Amatius was able to establish himself as the head of the most ardent Caesarophiles, why he was able to rally a large following among the Roman populus, and why Antony treated him as a serious threat. The family relations between Caesar and Amatius would be as in the accompanying chart.

A new piece of sacred space: If the place of Caesar’s cremation was thus sacralized, it is also worth noting that the time and the place of his death were correspondingly profaned, for the Senate decided never again to meet on the Ides of March, which it designated the “Day of Parricide,” while the Curia of Pompey, where the assassination occurred, was burnt, walled up, and finally converted to a public lavatory (cf. Suetonius *The Deified Julius* 88.3; Appian *Civil Wars* 2.147; Dio Cassius 47.19.1).



Family connections between Caesar and Amatius (“Marius”).

Rich ensemble of practices: Plutarch *Brutus* 20.4 explicitly compares aspects of Caesar’s tumultuous funeral to that celebrated for Clodius some eight years earlier. On the latter, see Dio Cassius 40.49.1–3; Appian *Civil Wars* 2.21; and Cicero *Pro Milone* 33 and 86. The discussion of Guy Achard, “«Ratio Popularis» et funéraires,” *Études classiques* 93 (1975), pp. 166–78 is fundamental. Caesar himself was part of this tradition, for in 69 B.C., he transformed the funeral of his aunt into a highly charged demonstration on behalf of Marius, her husband, whom the senatorial oligarchy had consigned to disgrace. On these and related events, see my article, “La politica di mito e rito nel funerale di Giulia: Cesare debutta nella sua carriera,” in *La cultura in Cesare*, ed. Diego Poli (Rome: Il Calamo, 1993), pp. 387–96.

Amatius’s death and subsequent events: Appian *Civil Wars* 3.3; Cicero *Philippic* 1.5; Livy *Periochae* 116. Dating is based on Cicero’s *Letter to Atticus* 14.8. Regarding the army as Antony’s base of support, see Rita Scuderi, “Marco Antonio nell’opinione pubblica dei militari,” *Scienze storiche* 17 (1978), pp. 117–37.

Crime and Punishment

Rituals of execution: For a variety of views, see the essays collected in *Du châtimement dans la cité: Supplices corporels et peine de mort dans le monde antique* (Rome: École française de Rome, 1984), esp. Jean-Michel David, “Du Comitium à la roche Tarpéienne. Sur certains rituels d’exécution capitale sous la République, les règnes d’Auguste et de Tibère” (pp. 131–76) and Dominique Briquel, “Formes de mise à mort dans la Rome primitive: quelques remarques sur une approche comparative du problème” (pp. 225–40).

Reactions to Amatius’s execution: The fullest description is in Appian *Civil Wars* 3.3, from which the quoted phrase is taken. See also Cicero *Philippic* 1.5; Dio Cassius 44.51.1–2. Note that the victims of Antony’s repression were also treated to ritual degradation: the slaves among them were crucified, and freed men were flung from the Tarpian Rock.

The Tears of a Clown

Profound disorder: Thersites’ speech is said to be *a-kosmos* (“acosmic”) at *Iliad* 2.214 and *ou kata kosmon* (“not in accord with order”) in the following line. The order in question may simply be that of social rectitude and propriety, but it may also be the very order of the cosmos, as is indicated when the latter phrase is used to describe the actions of those gods who would go so far as to defy Zeus’s will (Cf. *Iliad* 5.759 and 8.12).

Other audiences: Throughout antiquity opinions are almost universally hostile. Change comes rather gradually, as when Shakespeare gave his thoroughly unpleasant Thersites some credit for intellect and wit, in contrast to the other, more brawny Greeks (e.g. *Troilus and Cressida*, act II, scenes i and iii), or when Lessing, while generally approving of Homer's portrayal, reacted thus to the extra-Homeric descriptions of Thersites' death at the hands of Achilles:

The irascible and murderous Achilles becomes more hateful to me than the malicious, snarling Thersites; and I am offended by the cheers of the Greeks at this deed. My sympathies are with Diomedes, who draws his sword to avenge the murder of his kinsman, for I feel that Thersites as a human is my kinsman too. (*Laocoon*, chap. 23; trans. E. A. McCormick)

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberals have often adopted Thersites as a hero, following J. P. Mahaffy's depiction of him as one of "the first critics that rose up among the people and questioned the divine right of kings to do wrong" (*Social Life in Greece* (New York: Macmillan, 1898), p. 13. Others, however, have taken a different stance, as witness the attempt of some Nazi ideologists to see in him the prototype of an older, "Asiatic" population (i.e. Semitic), in contrast to the *Iliad*'s other, more Aryan heroes: thus, e.g., Hans F. K. Günther, *Rasengeschichte des hellenischen und römischen Volkes* (Munich: J. F. Lehmann, 1929), pp. 20-21. For the history of various interpretations, see Gebhard's article in the Pauly-Wissowa *Realencyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, vol. 5 A/2, pp. 2455-71; Abraham Feldman, "The Apotheosis of Thersites," *Classical Journal* 42 (1946-47): 219-221; H. D. Rankin, "Thersites the Malcontent: A Discussion," *Symbolae Osloenses* 47 (1972): 36-60; Peter Rose, "Thersites and the Plural Voices of Homer," *Arethusa* 21 (1988): 5-25; and Antonio La Penna, *Tersite censurato e altri studi di letteratura fra antico e moderno* (Pisa: Nistri-Lischi, 1991).

CHAPTER NINE

Stages and Stage Management

Throne of St. Peter: It is probably worth noting that only pronouncements made from this exalted seat are regarded as infallible, and are said to be made *ex cathedra* ("from the chair").

Shattered Eagles and Resourceful Monkeys

New York Times' account: "Reagan Unhurt After Man Smashes 30-Pound Statue," 14 April 1992, p. A16. See also the *Times*' follow-up stories: "Protester Who Accosted Reagan is Released on Own Recognizance," 15 April 1992, p. A16; and "Protester at Reagan Speech Had Press Credentials," 16 April 1992, p. A8. Most major dailies included similar stories, following Associated Press coverage. Jim Laurie's photograph (figure 9.1) was usually included, and a videotape of the incident made by the NAB was shown on most television news broadcasts.

Rick Paul Springer: Most of the information included here is taken from interviews with Mr. Springer (25 January 1993), correspondence with him (16 September and 13 October 1993), as well as discussions with several of his colleagues in the Hundredth Monkey Project and his attorneys, William Carrico (10 December 1992) and Susan Quig-Terry (26 January 1994). I have also made use of biographical materials included in the Hundredth Monkey grant proposal, a copy of which Mr. Springer kindly sent to me. I am also grateful to him for having corrected several minor errors of fact in an earlier draft of this chapter.

Complacency is widespread: At times, Mr. Springer speaks very harshly on this, as when he explained to me his view "The U.S. is largely a nation of spoiled brats, seduced into a stupor of complacency through comfort, convenience, materialism and entertainment." Interview, 25 January 1993.

The Hundredth Monkey: Ken Keyes, Jr., *The Hundredth Monkey* (Coos Bay, Ore.: Vision Books, 1982). The sentences quoted come from pp. 15 and 19. According to Keyes (interview, 26 August 1993), he was not connected with Springer or the Hundredth Monkey Project, but had no objections to his use of the name. Keyes' book itself has a fascinating history. Some 1.1 million copies have been distributed in the United States, and it has been translated into a dozen foreign languages. About a quarter of these copies Keyes donated to people

or groups who promised to make good use of them; the rest were priced cheaply so they could circulate widely, but still yield some profit, and with the income he has funded a center, foundation, publishing house, and training institute devoted to the antinuclear cause. On page 2 of *The Hundredth Monkey* appears the following notice: "This book is not copyrighted. You are asked to reproduce it in whole or in part, to distribute it with or without charge, in as many languages as possible, to as many people as possible. The rapid alerting of all humankind to nuclear realities is supremely urgent. If we are wiped out by nuclear destruction in the next few years, how important are the things we are doing today."

Promotional materials: Mailing distributed by the Hundredth Monkey Project, courtesy of Rick Springer.

"I was a great dreamer": Interview, 25 January 1993. Reflecting on this statement later (private correspondence, 16 Sept. 1993), Springer stated: "Perhaps I said 'I was a great dreamer,' but what I really believe is that 'I *am* a great dreamer.'"

Other People's Stages

National Association of Broadcasters: It is worth underscoring the size and importance of the NAB. According to the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, 28th ed. (1994) p. 88, it has some 17 million members and a professional staff of 165. It publishes two annuals and two weeklies, maintains 28 standing committees, and has an annual budget of \$17 million. Moreover, as the trade association for the radio/television industry, it is, in effect, that stage whose audience consists of the people who manage the most popular stages of all others.

"A deathhold on the media": Interview, 25 January 1993. Mr. Springer further argued that a small number of large corporations control communications in the United States and that, in general, the media support the nuclear industry, citing Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, 4th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992) in support of his views.

Eddie Fritts: According to Mr. Reagan's remarks, prior to becoming executive director of the NAB, Fritts had served in his administration as vice chairman of the Presidential Board of Advisors on Private Sector Initiatives.

"The clearest, most meditative moment": Rick Springer, "Excuse Me, Mr. President," *New Age Journal* (July/August 1992), p. 50.

"Bombing the water supply": Interview, 25 January 1993. See also the testimony Mr. Springer gave in court, quoted in appendix F.

State and federal offenses: Springer was initially charged with interfering with the work of the Secret Service and destroying private property (the crystal eagle) and was released on his own recognizance. In October 1992, he pled guilty to the former charge in federal court, and was sentenced to four months in prison. For a complex set of reasons, he elected not to report as scheduled in June 1993, but to continue his work against nuclear testing. He was apprehended two months later, while doing media interviews in connection with commemorations of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Charged with failure to surrender, Mr. Springer pled not guilty and argued that a higher moral law compelled him to continue his work against nuclear testing. His first trial on these charges ended with a hung jury (27 October 1993), and in the wake of this, state charges against him were dropped. Federal prosecutors elected to retry his case, however, and won conviction in a second trial (24 January 1994). As I write, Mr. Springer is in the North Las Vegas Detention Center, where he awaits sentencing on these charges.

"Is he a Democrat, by chance?": Peter Viles, "Reagan's Shattering Moment," *Broadcasting* 122/17 (20 April 1992), p. 5.

Struggles between Actors and Struggles between Stages

Interviews: Most notable is Springer's appearance on "CBS This Morning," quoted in appendix C. He also appeared on a local broadcast in Los Angeles (Channel 9, "Cross-Talk"). According to the May 1992 edition of "Monkey Business" (the newsletter of the Hundredth Monkey Project): "Rick has been doing innumerable TV and radio interviews in order to bring the nuclear testing issue to light, and challenge the media to do responsible reporting." The newsletter also announces a lecture tour and the production of a documentary film covering the full ten days of Project events.

Articles: Mr. Springer published an account of his April actions, in — significantly — a counter-cultural journal: "Excuse Me, Mr. President," *New Age Journal* (July/August 1992), pp. 50-53 (for excerpts, see appendix E). He has been working on a book of the same title.

Court appearances: Gaining use of these stages proved both more costly and more difficult than Springer anticipated. When he pled guilty to federal charges, he was allowed to make a statement of his views that was reported in the press (U.S. vs. Rick Paul Springer, Docket No. CR-S-92-109-PMP[RJJ], heard 22 October 1992, Las Vegas District Court; appendix F). Springer pled not guilty to state charges, and hoped to focus this trial squarely on the issue of nuclear testing.

"CBS This Morning": Quotations are taken from the transcript for the 17 April 1992 "CBS This Morning" show, produced by Burrelle's Information Services, Livingston, New Jersey.

Introductions: One gets some idea of the various shades of authorization that are extended simply from considering the way guests were introduced on the 17 April show. In order, they were as follows (with Springer appearing just after Dr. Kessler).

"Dr. David Kessler is the commissioner of the FDA. He joins us this morning. Welcome. It's nice to see you again."

"Joining us to look at the rebound on Broadway is WCBS-TV entertainment editor Dennis Cunningham. Good morning, sir."

"Finding the right toy for your child can be a challenge. But you might find some help in the Oppenheim Portfolio, an independent guide that picks the best in toys, books and videos . . . And here with some examples is toy expert Joanne Oppenheim. Good morning. Welcome."

"Morgan Freeman is a two-time Oscar nominee for 'Street Smart' and 'Driving Miss Daisy' . . . And Morgan Freeman is with us. Good morning."

"Arlyne Brickman grew up on New York's lower east side in a world of loan sharks and hit men. It was a world she liked and became a part of before she turned and became a government informant. Author Teresa Carpenter takes a look at Brickman's life in 'Mob Girl: A Woman's Life in the Underworld.' And Arlyne Brickman joins us this morning. Good morning."

"Among the questions every reporter learns to ask are how and why and those are the questions we're about to ask Barry Holden, who joins us from the New York City borough of Queens this morning, with his floating house. Good morning, Barry."

Hosts' reactions: Microanalysis of this segment of the broadcast would be rewarding, although it goes beyond the scope of this study. Inter alia, it should be noted that praise of Springer began with the member of the show's team who enjoys least authority, and thus has greatest license to express unconventional opinions: the weatherman. Further, specific praises reflect a gendered division: the male host commented on Springer's principles and commitment, the female host on his courtesy, and the meteorologist on his courage and powers of articulation.

Wall Street Journal editorial: "The Hundredth Monkey Speaks," *Wall Street Journal*, 21 April 1992, p. A16.

Uncritical nature of deference: Relations of epistemic authority by their very nature involve suspension or, at least, some attenuation of

critical judgment, since they are predicated on an asymmetry of expertise between audience and speaker that leaves the former incompetent to criticize the latter's pronouncements. The situation of executive authority differs somewhat, for as Michael Oakshott and others have argued, taking their lead from Hobbes, those subject to such authority need not believe that those who hold it are particularly excellent, only that they have come to hold it in legitimate ways. Privates are thus free to think what they like of officers and the orders they give, provided they obey them. The argument is developed, inter alia, in Oakshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); R. E. Flathman, *The Practice of Political Authority* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); R. B. Friedman, "On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy," in *Authority*, ed. Joseph Raz, pp. 56-91, and Joseph Raz, "Authority and Justification," in *ibid.*, pp. 115-41. In essence, this analysis focuses on the person who speaks with authority rather than the speech or the speech situation, and further, dissolves that person into office and occupant, maximizing the import of the former and minimizing the latter. For my part, as I hope I have made clear, all of these aspects (speech, speaker, situation, office and occupant) have their importance, and none is analytically dispensable. Beyond this, with specific regard to the issue of how much space executive authority allows for criticism, I would pose three questions in any given instance: first, whether those "in authority" tolerate criticism precisely because (and only so long as) it remains private—i.e., invisible, inaudible, and inconsequential; second, whether such criticism, in which one finds the seeds of all the corrosive discourses we have considered, is really so impotent as this view would suggest; and third, in light of the potential such critiques have to undermine the authority of those against whom they are directed, whether such persons do not, in practice, attempt in one fashion or another to render their audiences incapable of advancing them, even within some restricted, private sphere.